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# USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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## MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

### BOOK REVIEW: HISTORY OF SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 81 (signed to press 5 Jan 81) pp 90-92

[Review by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col R. Savushkin of the book "Istoriya Sovetskoy Voennoy Mysli (Kratkiy Ocherk, 1917-Iyun' 1941)" [The History of Soviet Military Thought (A Brief Essay, 1917-June 1941)] by I. A. Korotkov, Nauka, Moscow, 1980, 272 pages, price 1 ruble 80 kopecks]

[Text] Soviet military thought which is directed and shaped by the Communist Party is constantly searching for new ways and seeking out additional opportunities to strengthen the defense capability of our motherland and to solve the tasks of military organizational development. In continuously developing, in profoundly assessing the present and moving boldly into the future, it at the same time turns back to the past in strictly following the admonitions of the founders of Marxism-Leninism not to forget the lessons of history. And this also helps to deepen the military scientific and professional knowledge of the military cadres.

The book of I. Korotkov is devoted to an analysis of the history of the founding and development of Soviet military thought from 1917 through June 1941. And although chronologically the research is restricted to just the prewar period, many judgments and conclusions contained in this work are also pertinent to the present situation. In disclosing the concept of "military thought," the author shows that from the moment of its inception Soviet military thought has encompassed a broader range of questions than Soviet military science. Soviet military thought, as is apparent from the monograph, is a fusion of ideas from Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, the military policy of the CPSU and Soviet military doctrine, component parts of Soviet military science and the theories which reflect the processes of the mobilizing of all the forces and resources of a nation for the purpose of waging a war in the defense of the socialist fatherland. It includes both practically tested knowledge as well as concepts which are in the process of elaboration, hypotheses, not only a positive exposition of scientific problems but also criticism of the bourgeois falsifiers who endeavor to distort the nature and significance of the achievements in Soviet military thought.

In being aware of the complexity and many facets of the subject of research, the author in his work has not set for himself the goal of stating all the problems in the history of Soviet military thought of the designated period. He has concentrated attention on those basic aspects which provide an opportunity to show the

qualitative difference of military thought in a socialist state from the military thought of the preceding socioeconomic formations. And in precise terms this means a concentration on the struggle for the establishing of Marxist-Leninist theory in the military area, on the close organic link of military thought with past and present experience, with life and practice and on its elaboration of the Leninist idea of waging war by the entire nation, that is, by the armed forces and the entire rear of the Soviet state.

Both the logical structure and the contents of the work are subordinated to bringing out these fundamental problems. The chapter "Marxist-Leninist Military Theoretical Thought at the Beginning of the 1920's" traces the process of the birth of Soviet military thought. In relying on the firm foundation of Marxism-Leninism and on the teachings about war and the army, having critically assimilated the achievements of bourgeois military theory, Soviet military thought successfully dealt with an analysis of the new phenomena in military affairs which arose out of the socialist revolution and solved a number of very complex problems of military organizational development, military art and the mobilizing of the efforts of the rear for the needs of the front. All of this contributed to the victory in the Civil War.

After the Civil War, Soviet military thought was developed by the collective efforts of the party Central Committee, by the Army and Navy Leninist communists as well as by the forces of the old-school military theoreticians who were serving in the Red Army. One of the most difficult tasks in those times was the training of military personnel, including military scientific personnel. For this reason a separate chapter of the reviewed work is devoted to how the new Soviet military-scientific and military-pedagogical personnel was trained. This has been written with the aid of rich documentary and factual material. In analyzing events related to the embodiment of the Decree of the VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee of 25 January 1931 "On the Journal POD ZNAMENEM MARKSIZMA" and the introduction of the course on "The Teachings of Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army" in the military academies, the author has emphasized that the teaching of this subject was viewed not as a supplement to the military disciplines but rather as a basis for developing in the students an integrated Marxist-Leninist system of views on war and military organizational development.

In the interwar years, the party also had to wage an acute struggle for the purity of Soviet military thought and for unmasking and eradicating petty bourgeois, Trotskyite ideology. The chapter dealing with the establishing of Marxist-Leninist theory in the military area naturally reviews already known questions such as: the discussion on a unified military doctrine, the adoption of the territorial militia system of the organizational development of the Red Army and the carrying out of the military reform. However the author has succeeded in illuminating new facets of these questions, to give little-known facts and to recreate the emotional atmosphere of the party's struggle against the Trotskyites. The pages of the book on the linkage, interaction and mutual influence of military doctrine and military theory are read with interest. The problem is a complicated one. But the ways the author has proposed to solve it merit attention.

The chapter "Studying the Experience of the War" discloses the link of Soviet military thought with combat experience. The author shows the importance of the Leninist approach to an analysis and assessment of experience, to extracting from it

lessons for practical activities, to studying and systematizing historical facts, to formulating conclusions and so forth. In the book there is convincing criticism of the two "extreme tendencies" in assimilating the experience of World War I and the Civil War, and a conclusion is drawn on the need to examine "not only the successes of the sides but also the failures which can also teach a great deal." The chapter contains a series of examples of organizing scientific research in the 1930's. The conclusion that a study of the experience of current wars should be carried out by collective efforts is also timely for our days.

In the reviewed work the central place is held by chapters in which the views are given on the nature of a future war and its logistical support. The leitmotiv of the content of these chapters is the Leninist thesis that a modern war is waged not only by armed force but also by the entire nation as a whole.

The author examines the views on the sociopolitical nature of war, he analyzes its strategic concepts and discloses the evolution of the views on the content of the initial period of the war, the questions of the theory of operational arts and tactics and the use of the armed services and branches of troops.

The book has shown that, relying on the Leninist theses concerning the nature and types of wars in the modern age, Soviet military thought even before the beginning of the war which was being prepared against us correctly had determined that the war would be a clash between the old, rotten, reactionary world of capitalism and the new, growing, progressive world of socialism. It had established that from the very outset the war would assume an overtly class, decisive nature and on the part of the USSR be a just and liberating war, a war of all the Soviet people against the imperialist aggressors. The book gives a number of assessments of the war which had already commenced in the West including the reasons, the objectives of the sides and the placement of the political forces. Original material is provided for a theoretical discussion on the strategies of total defeat and wearing down. Up to now in our literature this question has not always been fully treated and the concepts of the sides were given in a schematic manner. Also convincing are the author's judgments on the coalition nature of the war, its duration and the relationship of static and fluid actions.

The problem of the initial period of a war has repeatedly been the subject of analysis in our literature. The author also makes his contribution to elaborating the question in consistently disclosing the development of views on the initial period of a war.

In introducing the reader to the sphere of the theory of military economy, the book shows how, in relying on Leninist ideas, Soviet military scientific thought during the surveyed years solved the questions of preparing the entire nation for conducting a war in defense of the socialist fatherland and defined the role in the war of the various areas of the economy such as industry, agriculture and transportation, the ways for creating material stocks, converting the economy to a wartime footing, the rearming of the Army and Navy and many others. All these questions have not lost their timeliness at the present stage. A number of conclusions from an analysis of Soviet military thought of the interwar period merits consideration in settling the urgent tasks of today.



In the course of the author's further work on the subject it would be desirable to clarify a number of provisions and formulations. Thus, a clearer formulation of the subject of the fifth chapter seems essential. It raises the question not only of the theory per se of military art (as is stated in the title) but also the problems of Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army and provisions of Soviet military doctrine. Certain formulations of the concepts of the initial period of the war also need clarification. In particular, the author should more definitely state the views on the strategic deployment of Soviet troops along the Western frontier and the creation of two strategic echelons. The essence of successive offensive operations and the essence of an offensive operation in depth have not been clearly formulated. The time of the "first approximate formulation of the theory of an operation in depth" has not been specifically established.

The experience of the genesis and development of Soviet military theoretical thought as generalized and stated in the reviewed book will be of help for our military personnel in further elaborating the problems of military theory and practice for the sake of strengthening the defense might of our nation and for raising the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. The book merits being read by a broad range of readers.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL STAFF

CONTENTS OF 'KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL', No 2, 1981

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 81 (signed to press 5 Jan 81) pp 1-2

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## ARMED FORCES

### RESULTS OF PARTY MEETINGS REVIEWED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 81 (signed to press 5 Jan 81) pp 34-43

[Article by Lt Gen V. Balakirev, chief of the Directorate for Party Organizational Work under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Most Massive Review of Party Forces; On the Results of the Party Report and Election Meetings and Conferences in the Army and Navy"]

[Text] A particularly responsible time has just ended in the work of the party organizations and political bodies and in the life of the Army and Navy communists. The report-election campaign, a most important stage in preparing the Army and Navy communists for the 26th CPSU Congress, ended with the holding of party conferences in the districts, groups of forces and fleets of the Armed Forces. They are approaching the highest party forum in close unity with the entire party and with all the Soviet people, day by day having an ever-greater influence on further improving the training and indoctrination of the personnel, on raising the combat readiness of the units and ships and on strengthening the defense capability of the nation.

The discussion of the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee for the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990" in the district, group and fleet party conferences as well as in the party organizations has shown that the communists unanimously approve the plans outlined by the party and the prospects for a further rise in the Soviet economy, science and culture. They see in them the successful realization of one of the guarantees for strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet motherland and are clearly aware of their role in carrying out the set tasks.

The meetings and conferences convincingly demonstrated the close solidarity of the communists and all the Army and Navy personnel with the CPSU Central Committee, the Central Committee Politburo headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the complete and ardent support for our party's domestic and foreign policy, an understanding of the complexity of the situation in the contemporary world and a readiness to honorably carry out their sacred duty of defending the socialist fatherland.

The June and October (1980) plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the instructions and recommendations given by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev had a decisive impact on the level of holding the reports and elections. They largely contributed to a more profound and thorough analysis of party work and to the creation of a situation of

professionalism, exactingness, principled criticism and self-criticism at the meetings and conferences. The activeness with which the report-election meetings were held shows the great interest of the communists and a true collective search for ways to improve things in each area. Participating in the discussion of the accountability reports in the party groups were 85 percent of the communists, 75 percent of the party members and candidate members in the company or equal party organizations, and one out of every three communists in the primary party organizations. Many useful proposals were voiced aimed at strengthening the party's influence on all aspects of the life and activities of the units and ships. In the Strategic Rocket Troops, for example, the political sections considered more than 9,000 proposals, 7,000 in the Navy, 6,000 in the Carpathian Military District, and more than 1,000 in the Central Group of Forces. The report and election meetings and conferences in fact became the most massive review of our party forces, a great school and a true university for each communist.

In the course of the reports and elections, the results of carrying out the tasks posed for the Armed Forces by the 25th CPSU Congress were summed up, and proper attention was paid to all aspects of party work, political, organizational and ideological. In summing up these results, the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal D. F. Ustinov, in a speech at the party conference in the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District said: "The CPSU is constantly concerned for improving our Armed Forces and providing them with everything necessary. Due to this concern of the party and the entire Soviet people during the years which have passed since the 25th CPSU Congress, the might and combat readiness of the Army and Navy have risen to a new qualitative level.

"In preparing for the 26th CPSU Congress, the Armed Forces have achieved high indicators in military and political training. The tactical teamwork of many formations and units has been improved. The modern weapons have begun to be more effectively used. The party's influence has been strengthened on all fundamental processes occurring in the Army and Navy. The effectiveness of party political work has risen, and its ties have been strengthened with carrying out the tasks of military and political training, increasing combat readiness and strengthening discipline and law and order. The content of the socialist competition has been enriched. The indoctrinational role of the Army and Navy has risen."

The reports and elections have clearly confirmed that the steady carrying out of the ideas of the 25th Party Congress and the subsequent decrees of the Central Committee has significantly enriched party work and has largely contributed to its higher quality and effectiveness. The meetings and conferences also noted such essential traits of party work apparent in this period as its inseparable link with the party-wide and state-wide tasks primarily in the area of national defense, the organization and indoctrination of the masses, the fuller consideration of the complexity of the military political situation, the particular features of the tasks being carried out and the conditions under which they have been carried out, and an active search for procedures and methods to improve the effectiveness and quality of organizational and ideological indoctrination activities.

The carrying out of the instructions of the 25th CPSU Congress on strengthening party leadership and improving the activities of all the party elements has helped to further raise the role and activeness of the political bodies and party organizations. After the congress there was an increase in the number of army and navy

party organizations and party groups. At present they exist in a significant majority of the companies, batteries and equivalent subunits, providing a direct party influence on all the basic structural elements of the units, the headquarters bodies and duty forces.

Now it is a question of being able to draw lessons from all that was reviewed, discussed, criticized, to reinforce the positive processes and make the positive experience acquired in the period between the congresses available to all the political bodies and party organizations.

On the political level, the main thing in the content of all political work, as before, should be the strong and steady carrying out of the decisions of the party congresses and the party Central Committee and the instructions of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on defense questions and the carrying out of the tasks set by the USSR minister of defense for the Army and Navy personnel.

It is very characteristic that during the meetings and conferences, in discussing the problems of improving the political approach to carrying out the tasks of combat readiness, an examination of the vanguard role and exacting assessment of the personal contribution of each party member and candidate member in his assigned job was in the forefront. At present up to 60 percent of the Army and Navy communists are outstanding men in military and political training. This has had a substantial influence on the course of combat training. Many political bodies and party organizations with the means inherent to them have a constant influence on the achieving of high and stable results in field, sea and air skills and they promptly eliminate the shortcomings in the training and indoctrination of the personnel. Each new step ahead by the Armed Forces along the path of further strengthening combat readiness and raising their might contains a decisive contribution by the commanders, the political workers, the party organizations and all communists.

The first months of winter combat training and the widely developed competition of the personnel to properly greet the 26th CPSU Congress reaffirm that where party political work is conducted actively and effectively, where the party organizations knowledgeably work to eliminate shortcomings, there the questions of further increasing combat readiness, improving the skills of the personnel and strengthening organization and discipline are more successfully solved.

At the party conference of one of the formations in the Central Group of Forces the work of the party organization of the tank regiment where Capt P. Drapiko is the secretary was spoken of with approval. Characteristic of the activities of the party committee are professionalism, a creative approach and tenacity in carrying out any tasks. The secretary and the other party committee members are frequently in the subunit party organizations and at the tank driving range, they promptly spot and effectively disseminate advanced experience and place great demands on those who are responsible for negligence in carrying out duties. And they do this not only by the right of those who have been given the confidence of all the communists but also out of the high moral right that the party committee members should be an example for others in service and training. In the final inspection virtually all of them received a grade of "excellent" for driving and firing. In working to equal the party activists, one out of every two communists hit the target on the first round and at maximum range. In the regiment two-thirds of the party members and candidate members are outstanding men in military and political training. The



regiment is successfully carrying out the obligations assumed in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress.

High indicators in combat training have been attained by the initiator of the socialist competition in the Navy in 1980, the crew of the large subchaser "Petro-pavlovsk." As was pointed out at the party conference of the Pacific Fleet, the communists from the ship have done a great deal to make the competition an inseparable part of the entire training process and closely tied to the tasks of mastering the equipment and weapons and maintaining the ship in constant combat readiness. The party bureau has given particular attention to the training and indoctrination of the aktiv, to publicizing and comparing the results of the competition, to propagandizing advanced experience and to individual work with the men. The best of the sailors became communists during the report period. One-half of the personnel from the ship ASW crew are party members and candidate members. They ensure an unflagging party influence on fellow servicemen and a high pitch of comradely competitiveness in military service.

Certainly there are many similar examples in the Army and Navy. It is all the more important, as was emphasized in the course of the reports and elections, to steadily introduce the acquired advanced experience, to achieve a further rise in the activity and militancy of the party organizations, to show intolerance for complacency and indifference and have a self-critical approach to assessing the achieved level. The very nature of many speeches at the meetings and conferences pointed to this. One out of every two comments and proposals was aimed at improving combat readiness, carrying out the tasks of field, air and sea skills and overcoming the existing shortcomings in party work.

The party committee of the regiment where Maj N. Ivanov is the secretary at the conference of one of the formations of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany was sharply criticized for poor knowledge of the actual state of combat readiness and the skills of the personnel and for little exactingness on the party members for the quality of the training process. At the meetings here they repeatedly pointed out the reasons for the lag of the individual subunits, including such as the low organizing role of certain communist officers, their poor personal preparation and instances of a lack of objectivity in assessing the results of combat training. However, the party committee did not respond properly to this, it was unable to mobilize the party members and candidate members to eliminate the shortcomings, and did not hold the specific guilty parties responsible for oversights. This had a negative effect on the results of the combat improvement of the personnel.

The inability of individual party committees and bureaus to effectively use the means of party influence on solving the problems of combat readiness and the skills of the personnel, insufficient concreteness and efficiency in the posing of these questions for the communists are the most characteristic shortcomings in the work of a whole number of party organizations. Even at certain report and election meetings, the speakers dispassionately described the overall results of the year, without disclosing the position of the party body and the degree of its influence on the unsolved problems, nor did they analyze the very essence of party work which is work with people, its experience and the reasons for shortcomings. This was the case, for example, at the meeting in the regiment where Capt A. Chekhov is the party bureau secretary. For the results of the year the regiment received a

satisfactory evaluation and did not fulfill all the assumed obligations. However, neither in the report nor in the speeches was a noticeable attempt made to analyze the reason for this situation or to give a principled assessment to the shortcomings of the communists in the assigned jobs. General discussions and statements that it was essential to alter the attitude clearly predominated over a profound and self-critical analysis of the activities of the party organization. Why did this occur?

We feel that to a definite degree this was due to the level of leadership by the political bodies over the activities of the party committees and bureaus, the party organization secretaries and the party group organizers. Obviously it was no accident that at certain conferences in the formations, the state, forms and methods of work of the primary organizations in the main areas and the experience of the political sections in this area were examined without profound analysis. Such facts force one to conclude that the political bodies must go more profoundly and specifically into all aspects of the life and activities of the unit and ship party organizations, they must more actively influence the carrying out of combat training missions and assess party activities not from the number of questions examined at the meetings and sessions or the statements heard but rather from the effectiveness of the work done. All these questions in a more instructive manner and in the specific situation must be brought up at assemblies, seminars and meetings of the political bodies and the reports of the party organization secretaries and the deputy commanders for political affairs must be more carefully reviewed. It is also important to significantly raise the exactingness of the political bodies and party organizations, sharpen their impatience for instances of indifference and carelessness, and be more demanding on the communists for the state of affairs in the specific assigned area.

As the reports and elections showed, party influence on the strengthening of organization and discipline should be particularly effective. Here it is essential to consider that a majority of communists are officers. Hence it is essential that they first of all show an exemplary attitude toward service, efficiency and the observance of the standards of communist morality. On the other hand, the officers, as a rule, are the organizers of training and indoctrination and this obliges the political bodies and party organizations to show constant concern for their mastery of the art of working with people.

The political bodies and party organizations can do a great deal to develop the required political and professional qualities in the men and to further their organizational and pedagogical abilities. In this area each district has positive experience. At the party conference of one of the formations in the Central Asian Military District, where Maj M. Telushko is the senior instructor of the political section for party organizational work, there was a thorough analysis of the effectiveness of the measures employed to strengthen discipline and the work practices of the political body in the lagging units and subunits. The delegates spoke with approval about the results of discussing at the meetings the question of the personal contribution of the communists to political indoctrination in the company and of instructive seminars with the subunit commanders devoted to the training and indoctrination practices. As a result, here last year, there were no major violations of discipline and order in the subunits which had party organizations as well as in the companies and batteries where communists live in the barracks. This experience merits careful study and dissemination. All the more so at certain meetings and conferences, including in the Urals, Transcaucasian and Turkestan military districts, the Moscow

Air Defense District and the Black Sea Fleet, instances were given of insufficiently effective party work to ensure organization and prevent disciplinary violations. One cannot help but pay attention to the fact that in discussing disciplinary questions, they have not always been able to avoid routine and the simple reiteration of various statistical data. This has happened because the role of the party committees and party bureaus was often reduced merely to a review of the misdeeds of the communists and to appeals to strengthen proper order while such appeals were not reinforced by vital organizational and indoctrinational activities.

For strengthening party influence on the carrying out of the main tasks confronting the units and the ships, it is essential to maximally activate all the means of party influence, to utilize them skillfully, to strictly observe the standards of party life and raise the role of the primary party organizations. Hence it is a question of the greatest possible improvement in the organizational aspect of party work. Its thorough analysis in the course of the reports and elections, particularly at the conferences in the formations, showed greater attention to ensuring the vanguard role and sociopolitical activeness of the party members and candidate members, to the activities of the party committees and bureaus and to the leadership of the party organizations by the political bodies. The significance of the party meetings and the carrying out of assignments is being increased in the indoctrination of the communists. The hearing of reports and statements and the holding of individual colloquiums tell favorably on the service and activeness of the party members and candidate members.

After the 25th CPSU Congress, the practices of recruiting the leading servicemen into the party, the indoctrinating of young communists and their placement in the subunits were improved. The responsibility of the party organizations for this question was noticeably raised. Stricter demands were placed on the communists and the Komsomol organizations which gave recommendations on persons being admitted to the CPSU. The evening party schools and the young communist circles operating in the units helped them better assimilate the CPSU Program and By-Laws and take an active part in party life. However the previously designated shortcomings have not been completely eliminated. It was no accident that at certain meetings and conferences these questions were examined without proper sharpness and a principled assessment was not always given to the instances of a superficial checking of persons being admitted to the party and hurry in the review of their applications. At individual meetings, in particular in the Volga, North Caucasus military districts, the Southern Group of Forces and in the Northern Fleet, the level of work of the party committees and bureaus was sometimes judged predominantly by a comparison of the number of persons admitted to the party by subunits, but there was little analysis of the results of the growth of the party ranks or the shortcomings and flaws in this area.

One cannot help but admit that in a number of report and election meetings and conferences, the organizational aspect of party work was superficially analyzed, without consideration of the circumstance that at present a greater return is required from party work in the party groups and party organizations of the subunits, that is, in those elements which comprise the basis of the troop and fleet organism. Here the network of party organizations and groups is becoming evermore diversified and their role is constantly growing. However, in many meetings in the primary organizations and in the reports of the political bodies at certain conferences, the activities of these party elements at times were wrongly overlooked and little



attention was given to the battalion and equivalent party organizations. The work of the party committees and bureaus as bodies of collective leadership was not sufficiently analyzed, and a profound assessment was not always given to such important questions as carrying out the decisions taken and organizing party information and the activities of the party members and candidate members as part of the elected Komsomol and trade union bodies and people's control groups.

The importance of the organizational aspect of party work is growing and consequently more attention should be paid to such key aspects of it as improving the check on execution and work with the personnel. At present, for example, precisely the realizing of constant and effective checks on execution of the decisions taken is a particularly weak point. The aim of control is not the recording of oversights and mistakes but rather to ensure a unity of word and deed. For this help must be combined with strict control, executive discipline and the authority of the decisions taken must be increased, and their organizing and indoctrinational effect on all aspects of Army and Navy life strengthened.

In the course of the reports and elections, there was a specific discussion of the carrying out of the provisions of the 25th CPSU Congress in the area of cadre policy. The meetings and conferences emphasized that all forms of cadre work produce fruitful results only with the consistent observance of Leninist principles of cadre recruitment, replacement and indoctrination and a fundamental position of the political bodies and party organizations in assessing the political, professional and moral qualities of the communist leaders. It was pointed out that many young officers hold responsible posts in the units and on the ships and at times they do not have the necessary experience. For this reason they must be given more support and aid in mastering the entire range of functional duties and be instilled with high party qualities. There has been strict condemnation for those who have lost their sense of responsibility, behave unworthily and violate party ethics. For example, in the elections of the party committees, the communist leaders Lt Col V. Prikhod'ko and Maj Yu. Kurmatov were rejected. They had been impolite, arrogant and had not considered the collective's opinion. The political worker Col A. Rushchenko who had been proposed as a delegate to the party conference was not elected because of poor work. Such facts again remind us that the political bodies and party organizations must make fuller use of the right given them to participate in the recruitment, placement and certification of the officer personnel. This is the best guarantee against mistakes and violations of cadre policy.

A rise in the level of party work is closely tied to the development of criticism from below. An analysis of the reports and elections shows that at certain meetings and conferences only criticism from above prevailed and there were not enough proposals aimed at improving the work style of the political bodies, the party committees and bureaus. This cannot be considered normal. "It must not be thought that an abundance of critical comments shows a poor state of affairs," emphasized Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "The relationship is precisely the reverse: the more open and public the criticism there is the better things go."

The party commissions under the political bodies have an important role to play in indoctrinating the communists in a spirit of strictly observing the required duties, party and military discipline and the standards of communist morality. Many of them, as was shown by the discussion of the accountability reports of the party

commissions at the conferences, recently have noticeably strengthened their activities. The party commissions have shown more concern for improving the quality of the party recruits, providing purity in the party ranks and have begun to more severely judge instances of deviation by individual communists from the party standards of conduct in service and everyday life. At the same time, in the speeches of the delegates it was stressed that in the future there must be an improvement in the work of the party commissions and stronger control over the observance of the CPSU By-Laws, party, state and military discipline by the party members and candidate members.

A distinguishing feature of the reports and elections was that more attention was paid to examining the ideological indoctrination aspect of the activities of the commanders, political bodies and party organizations. This was primarily aided by the work carried out in fulfilling the instructions of the 25th Party Congress and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" as well as the recommendations of the conference of Army and Navy command-political leadership which examined the questions of raising the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces. Many political bodies, party committees and bureaus have consistently carried out the demand of the CPSU Central Committee that each party organization become a center for daily ideological indoctrination activities and each communist become an active political fighter of the party. For example, this was thoroughly discussed at the party conferences of the Leningrad, Transbaykal, Baltic and Central Asian military districts, the Central Group of Forces and the Baltic Fleet. The reports and speeches pointed to the increased demands made on the communists for increasing their ideological theoretical level, for organizing effective political information for the servicemen and for participating in mass agitation work.

At the same time, here, in the opinion of the comrades who spoke, far from everything had been done. The party committees and bureaus have not yet utilized the significant reserves which they possess in the area of improving the quality and effectiveness of the ideological-political effect on the personnel. In indoctrinational work, particularly in such an element as the battalion, company or equivalent subunits, a great deal of formalism is permitted. Formalism was also felt in the report and election meetings. Certain party committees and bureaus, instead of analyzing the contents and effectiveness of ideological work, merely dealt with the quantitative indicators in propaganda and agitation, they named the communists who were part of the agitation and propaganda groups, but they often reduced the assessment of the indoctrination efforts by the party members to the number of measures carried out by them. There is no doubt about it, the scope of ideological work carried out by the party organizations has constantly grown. But here one cannot help but see that there is a certain number of party members, and not a small one, particularly among the workers of the headquarters personnel, which stands on the sidelines of personnel indoctrination. Some of them, when in the units, feel no need to meet and talk with the servicemen in the subunits on urgent questions or become familiar with their mood or needs. For example, in certain staff and headquarters party organizations of the Far Eastern Military District, a significant portion of the communists for a long period of time did not carry out assignments of an ideological nature. This shows the need to more persistently carry out the demands of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination."

One of the crucial conditions for success here should be the consistent implementation of the instructions that the party organizations should become the centers of daily ideological indoctrination activities. The carrying out of this task presupposes a significant strengthening of the practical influence of the party organizations and communists on all aspects of the life and activities of the units and ships, a close tie between indoctrination and the tasks being carried out, and the able and comprehensive use of all the existing resources for these purposes.

In the apt expression of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, ideology is a strong weapon in the hands of the party, and it must not be allowed to fire blanks. The political bodies and party organizations must direct the force of this weapon at the ideological and moral tempering of the personnel and the indoctrination of them in a spirit of high political vigilance and immunity to bourgeois ideology.

At the meetings and conferences there was an extensive discussion of a further improvement in the style and methods of activities by the political sections and political directorates as the leading party bodies of the CPSU in the Armed Forces and of their concern for increasing the role of the primary party organizations as the basic party elements. In the period between the congresses, a good deal has already been done for this. However, the acquired experience which must be reinforced in practice at times coexists with certain omissions. As yet not all the political bodies provide sufficiently close leadership over the party organizations. Certain workers of the political bodies are little concerned with improving the forms and methods of party organization activities, they rarely consult with the aktiv or communists on the most pressing problems and for a long time do not attend the meetings and sessions of the party committees and bureaus.

In summing up the results of the reports and elections, it can be asserted that the most reputable, politically mature and enterprising communists have been elected to the leading bodies of the party organizations. It is worthy of note that the commanders of the regiments and ships have been elected as members to more than 90 percent of the party committees and bureaus. The general educational level of the party aktiv has also risen. More than one-half of the party organization secretaries, including 62 percent of the party committee secretaries, has a higher education. The composition of the party committee secretaries has become somewhat stabler. However, one-third of the secretaries in the primary party organizations has been newly elected, and this requires greater attention on the part of the political bodies to their training and indoctrination and to more skilled and differentiated instruction directly on the spot, in the process of carrying out the tasks by the units and ships.

In organizing the work of the newly elected party committees and bureaus, an important role is given to the deputy regimental (ship) commanders for political affairs. The Instructions to the CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy oblige them "to delve profoundly into the practical activities of the primary party organization and the subunit party organizations, to systematically instruct, train and indoctrinate the party aktiv, and together with the party committee (party bureau) and the secretary of the party organization to organize the carrying out of the party decisions and tasks confronting the party organization." We feel that the attention paid by the political bodies to the activities of the deputy commanders for political affairs should be significantly increased.



For raising the effectiveness of party work, it is important to make the fullest possible use of the wealth of experience and collective thought found in the proposals and critical comments of the communists. A speech at a party meeting or conference, as a rule, is the result of reflection and a manifestation of an activist position in life by a party member, the result of his involvement in the affairs of the entire collective. At present we are witnessing how, in responding to the party-wide concepts, the political bodies and party organizations have begun to be more attentive to the proposals from the communists. In many units, each professional proposal is examined by the commanders and political bodies and this makes it possible for them to see unutilized reserves. Precisely this is the attitude toward critical comments and proposals shown by the political section and the party organizations of the Guards Kantemir Tank Division. It has become a standard for the political section and party committees to generalize the proposals of the communists, to directly act on them and take them under control. As a whole more than one-half of the proposals and comments made here in the report and election meetings has been directly realized in the course of the reports and elections. The question of how to more effectively and fully carry out the orders of the communists was examined at party committee sessions of a number of units. There is no doubt that the implementation of what has been planned will further raise the militancy of the party organizations, the effectiveness of the meetings and the activeness of the communists.

At the same time it cannot yet be said that such an approach has been established everywhere. Instances are encountered when the proposals and critical comments are considered not actually but for the sake of form and do not become the basis of concrete practical work. At the large subchaser "Nikolayev" after the report-election meeting, the party bureau did not promptly generalize the proposals and comments from the communists. The political section also overlooked this. Of course, the situation here had already been rectified, but conclusions should have been drawn from the very fact. The political bodies must establish the closest control over the carrying out of the accepted decrees and the implementation of proposals and critical comments made in the preCongress period. It is also important to systematically inform the party members and candidate members of the measures being undertaken to follow up on their speeches. The political sections, party committees and bureaus should discuss and outline practical measures aimed at carrying out the decisions of the party conferences.

In the report-election meetings and conferences, a noticeable place was taken over by a discussion of questions related to the leadership of the Komsomol organizations and the training and indoctrination of their aktiv. The responsibility of the communists working in the Komsomol was emphasized. All of this obliges the party organizations to more thoroughly analyze the life of the youth collectives, to more fully consider their particular features, and daily direct the work of the Komsomol committees at making certain that the Komsomol members set an example in service and discipline. At present it is essential to help the Komsomol organizations mobilize the youth to properly celebrate the 26th CPSU Congress and to sum up the results of the all-Union relay of Komsomol combat deeds being carried out under the motto "Our Military Service for the Motherland and the Party, a Worthy Greeting for the 26th CPSU Congress!"

There must be constant party attention to the trade union organizations which unite in their ranks a large detachment of Army and Navy civilian employees. They actively influence the development of the socialist competition and the introduction of advanced experience everywhere. Understandably the party organizations should be particularly demanding on those who hold leadership posts in the trade union organizations, they should promptly spot and support creative initiative of the employees and decisively resist any attempts to disregard their legitimate rights and interests. This is all the more essential as there have been instances when trade union leaders in essence indulge some administrators who in pushing for high indicators abuse overtime, violate safety rules and industrial sanitation, and, as they say, force the plan at any price. An attentive, considerate attitude toward man, as was pointed out at the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, should permeate the entire style of work of the party, soviet and economic bodies and, of course, the trade unions. There cannot and should not be any room in our life for bureaucracy, callousness and pretentiousness.

As is known, the Army and Navy political bodies work in close contact with the local party bodies. In the course of the pregress report and election campaign, these ties have been further developed. The delegates from the Army and Navy party organizations participated in the work of the rayon, city, kray and oblast party conferences and the congresses of the Union republic communist parties. Many of them have become members of the local party bodies. A large group of representatives from the party organizations of the Armed Forces was elected delegates to the 26th CPSU Congress. Along with this, the leaders of the local party and soviet bodies have taken an active part in the work of a majority of the party conferences in the Army and Navy. This has contributed to the broader discussion of many important questions at the conferences and to a reciprocal exchange of experience.

In speaking of a party approach to an analysis of the results of a report period, V. I. Lenin urged that the achieved level be taken "as material, as a lesson, as a step by which we should move farther." The reports and elections of the party bodies helped examine a broad range of problems, all aspects of the life of the units, ships and formations and all areas of party work. They provided a powerful impetus for the initiative and activeness of the Army and Navy communists. At present the task is to make the greatest possible use of the experience gained by the political bodies and party organizations for further improving the state of affairs in all areas, for achieving new successes in the struggle to raise the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces and to properly greet the 26th CPSU Congress.

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[Article by Lt Gen A. Agafonov, chief of the Personnel Directorate of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Authority of the Political Worker"]

[Text] They were called and are called the soul of the Soviet Armed Forces. In them, the political workers and commissars, were seen, in the words of M. I. Kalinin, the face of the party in the Red Army.

And at present, the profession of a political worker as before is essential as a combat weapon for our Army and Navy in order to strengthen their might, to multiply the heroic traditions, so that each soldier is profoundly aware of his patriotic duty and always is ready to come to the defense of the motherland and the creative labor of the Soviet people who are building communism.

At present, the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990" published for nationwide discussion has evoked among all the personnel of the Army and Navy a new upsurge of patriotic feelings and feelings of pride for our motherland and for the Leninist Communist Party. In ardently approving the magnificent plans of the party, the men of the Army and Navy are expressing their determination in the future to vigilantly guard the victories of socialism and to mark the year of the 26th Party Congress, the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan, with new successes in strengthening the combat readiness of the USSR Armed Forces.

And the political workers have an important role to play in carrying out these tasks. In working hand in hand with the commanders and together with the party and Komsomol organizations, they devote all their energy and knowledge to indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of total loyalty to the Soviet motherland, to the Communist Party and to the Soviet government, in a spirit of vigilance and constant combat readiness.

The authority of the political workers is high in the masses of soldiers. Recognized Leninist fighters, they have been at the sources of our army, together with the commanders brought it glory during the years of the Civil War and led the men into



the attack against the enemy during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The grandsons of the legendary commissars, the sons of the heroic political leaders, worthy heirs and continuers of their deeds--this is how each armed defender of the motherland perceives today's political workers. They have the reputation of being the men closest to the soldiers, their advisers and senior comrades.

The authority of a political worker, like any leader, does not come with a diploma, it is not awarded like a rank and not presented with a promotion. Lenin taught that leaders win their authority "by their energy, by their ideological influence (and not by their titles and ranks, of course)."

The demands made upon the communists and above all those who have been promoted to leading positions have been strictly formulated in the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, in the Decree of the Party Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" and in other party documents. We find magnificent examples of what a political leader should be in the speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and in his books "Malaya Zemlya" [Little Earth], "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth] and "Tselina" [Virgin Land]. "A real political worker in the army," he wrote in his book "Malaya Zemlya", "is the person around whom the men are grouped, he truly knows their moods, needs, hopes and dreams and he leads them to self-sacrifice, to a feat."

Life does not stand still. With each passing day it places ever-higher demands upon the level and effectiveness of political and organizational work in the troops and hence on those who carry out this work. This has been brought about also by the exacerbation of the military political situation, by the heightened ideological struggle on the international scene, by the profound qualitative changes in military affairs and in the methods of conducting armed combat and by the constant rise of the general educational and cultural level of the personnel of the units, ships and subunits. For this reason the political workers see their main task in continuously and in every possible way improving political and organizational work with the servicemen, having focused their basic efforts on further raising the combat readiness of the subunits, units and ships.

Many political workers carry out their responsible party and service duty with dignity and honor. For example, in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Col V. Syun'kov has proved to be an able organizer of party political work; in the Turkestan Military District there is Maj G. Rolinskiy. In the Northern Fleet the work of the brothers Aleksandr and Yuriy Luk'yanov is well known. They are two captain lieutenants and ship political workers. In the Pacific Fleet their father, also a political worker, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Luk'yanov, is highly regarded.

"Deeds--these are the touchstone by which the true worth of a person is recognized," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. These and other political workers of the units and ships have won universal respect and unassailable authority precisely by their deeds.

As an example, let us return to the political workers, the Luk'yanov brothers. They serve on ships where the crews are competing between themselves. In working in close contact with the commanders and the party organizations and in relying on the Komsomol aktiv, the Luk'yanov's skillfully concentrate the efforts of the sailors on

carrying out the basic tasks related to further improving vigilance and combat readiness. Both officers have mastered well the art of conducting political work, they are experts in the tactics of naval battle and military technical questions and set an example in service, training and discipline. One might say they have "passed" scores of sailors through their hands and each sailor recalls these political workers with gratitude. For example, Capt Lt Yu. Luk'yanov recently received a letter from Sn (Res) Grigoriy Abramkin in which he thanked the officer for the help given in developing the qualities needed by a sailor. And the Luk'yanov brothers received many such letters.

Lt Col E. Yakovlev has great authority among the troops. In showing constant concern for raising the combat readiness of the artillery unit, Eduard Aleksandrovich insistently strives to utilize the entire arsenal of ideological indoctrination means so that they carry a strong mobilizing impact.

Thus, in recent tactical exercises involving field firing, the political worker was concerned that party political work be carried out continuously in all stages of the defense and offense and did not halt during a move of position and that not a single person remained without political exposure. In the battalions they regularly put out combat leaflets as well as radio and wall newspapers. Appeals from hero artillery troops of previous engagements to the young soldiers were passed from crew to crew. Directly by the guns talks were conducted on the military political situation in the world and on the missions being carried out by the artillery troops during one or another period of the exercises. The experience of the men who had distinguished themselves in the process of combat training firing was widely propagandized. Here Yakovlev made an effort for the artillery troops to receive information on the achievements of the pacesetters in the socialist competition and gain this experience, as is said, first hand.

And what has been the result? The activities of the political worker who was able to raise the party and Komsomol aktiv to mobilize the men brought tangible results. The men worked conscientiously and no one complained of fatigue. The spirit of competition was high everywhere. And constantly new crimson stars given for each accurate firing appeared on the gun barrels.

Yes, the authority of a political worker is directly dependent upon how conscientiously and earnestly he performs his duties. The range of these duties, as is known, is broad. There is not a single question in the life of the Army and Navy collective about which a political worker could say: this is not my affair, this does not concern me. Everything is his affair, everything concerns him and he must answer to the party and the people for everything. To invest into the training, service and life of the military collective a spirit of party loyalty and principledness, an awareness of high duty to the motherland and a desire to carry it out unstintingly--this is the main thing which should underlie the activities of each political worker. If he is able to correctly organize political indoctrination in the collective aimed at ensuring high combat readiness then the indicators of the men will be higher and both the leaders and subordinates will have a good opinion of him.

The success of carrying out this task, as life suggests, is largely determined by the unity of views and actions by the commanders and their deputies for political

affairs. To work closely and with cooperation means to focus general efforts on the primary questions and to subordinate thoughts and actions to the main goal of the combat readiness of the troop collective. It is completely unacceptable when personal interests are put higher than social ones. Such relationships become interference in service. Principledness, honesty and professionalism--these and other party qualities are the foundation for the unity of actions of the commanders and political workers.

Certainly a commander and political worker can have different opinions about something or a different approach to assessing individuals and their attitude toward service. There can be a number of different methods for finding the truth. What is important is that the interests of the question be put first and that useful judgments, fresh thinking, creativity and initiative be mutually respected.

For example, Col A. Udotov and Lt Col E. Yakovlev work precisely in this close manner. Udotov is an experienced commander, an able organizer and indoctrinator of subordinates. He delves profoundly into the life of the unit party organization and Komsomol members. His advice is good support in the political indoctrination of the lieutenant colonel. Yakovlev is Udotov's subordinate, but this does not mean that the political worker expects instructions from the commander for all instances of life and for every day. He constantly shows creative initiative, he promptly and skillfully raises problems bothering the collective and boldly states his opinion on them.

And it does happen that at times the views of these officers differ over the solution to one or another question. But the ability to hear out the arguments in a dispute and to critically assess one's own work always lead to a situation where the most objective and rational decision is taken as a result of the exchange of opinions.

Unfortunately, in a number of units cases of a different sort are encountered in both officers, in putting the interests of the question in the background, begin to argue over details and "establish" relationships in stubbornly defending their own, sometimes incorrect decisions. In such instances both the job and the authority of these persons suffer.

What is the way out? One solution presents itself. The duty of the political worker is to be constantly concerned with strengthening one-man leadership. But in the interests of the work, the commander must also support the authority of the political worker. Of course it is no question of any weaknesses or reducing demands upon a person, but rather one of tactfulness for an officer and the ability to listen to other opinions and consider useful ones in one's work bearing in mind that the deputy commander for political affairs, along with the commander, bears full responsibility for the state of affairs in the collective.

Political workers are not born. Organizational abilities come gradually. Recognition and authority come along with experience in work.

A political worker has true respect among the men when he possesses such qualities as profound ideological conviction, political purposefulness, party principledness, high professional skills and intolerance of any shortcomings which even to the slightest degree reduce the success of the collective.



"...The political worker should know and be able to do a great deal," said the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, in speaking at a scientific practical conference for the leading political workers of the Army and Navy. "If I were asked what is the main, basic quality which a political worker should possess, I would say first of all he should be a communist in the highest sense of this word. What has always and does distinguish the political worker of our army? For what is he highly regarded and believed in, why do the masses of soldiers follow him? Primarily for his most profound ideological conviction, high party loyalty, honesty and exemplariness in everything and for his close, real tie with the personnel."

In order to meet these requirements and become a true organizer of political indoctrination activities, it is essential to study a great deal and constantly work on oneself.

The studies of a political worker are a vast concept encompassing a large range of questions. But a profound mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory should be in the forefront. Precisely this is the basis for strong ideological tempering and is that very accurate compass which makes it possible to correctly find one's way in a situation, to effectively carry out current tasks and see the prospects for advancement.

The officer political workers gain sound knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory in the higher military schools and in various courses. The ordered system of training for political personnel which has been set up in the Armed Forces also contributes to a further deepening of knowledge. Its most important forms are exercises in the Marxist-Leninist study groups as well as seminars, theoretical and practical scientific conferences, colloquiums on the fundamental problems of party and military organizational development, studying in Marxism-Leninism universities and participation of the political workers in the holding of unified political days which have become widespread in the Armed Forces.

For example, studies for the political personnel have been well organized in many garrisons of the Moscow Military District, the Northern Fleet and in the units and formations of the Belorussian and Far Eastern districts. Here the training assemblies for political workers are carefully prepared for and creatively conducted. Their participants hear informative lectures on the problems of Marxist-Leninist theory, party and military organizational development and the military and political indoctrination of the personnel. They study the guiding documents on the questions of party political work and exchange experience in ideological indoctrination activities.

In speaking about the assemblies, seminars and other forms of mass work, we would like to mention one very important aspect. All these measures are beneficial to their direct participants only in the instance that the political workers will work with themselves independently and not be satisfied with just what the organizational forms of the studies provide them. A political worker from one of the tank units, Maj V. Antropov, finished a higher party school with honors. But regardless of this, he continues to steadily improve his own theoretical knowledge. He independently has made a thorough study of the works of V. I. Lenin, the party decisions and the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. He successfully combines the carrying out of service duties with correspondence studies in the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin. And the higher you go, as they say, the more you see. The leader more

profoundly analyzes modern phenomena in life and the state of affairs in the collective and critically analyzes his own work.

A political worker also does a good deal to improve the political studies of the personnel. In the unit the Marxist-Leninist training for officers, the political studies of the warrant officers ("praporshchik") and the political exercises for the soldiers and sergeants have been well organized. The agitation and propaganda collective works actively and purposefully and the ideological-political, military and moral indoctrination of the men is carried out on the proper level.

For example, at present in the unit they have skillfully organized an explanation of the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990." In discussing this very important party document with the men, the political worker and the party activists with profound knowledge and convincing arguments have shown the new goals for our further advancement as outlined in the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee. The goals are difficult but they are completely feasible, as they are based upon the enormous achievements of our nation in the sphere of the economy, social life and spiritual culture. In talks the communists particularly emphasize that the tasks set by the party will be more successfully carried out the weightier the contribution of each Soviet person to the overall success, including by each armed defender of the motherland.

The purposeful ideological political activities conducted in the regiment have told positively on their deeds. For several years running now the unit has held the leading place in the Guards Tank Division X. The authority of the political worker has been strengthened among his subordinates and fellow servicemen. And the senior chiefs also regard him highly.

"A party leader," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "if he does not want to fall behind should study all his life." And it is quite understandable that for a political worker these studies cannot be restricted to just political preparation. For example, can a deputy regimental commander for political affairs effectively influence the training process and effectively organize party political work to mobilize the men to master the equipment and weapons if he is poor in educational techniques, has a shallow understanding of tactical questions or possesses very hazy notions of the capabilities and advanced procedures for employing modern means of combat? Of course not. Under present conditions, when the army and navy are equipped with modern weapons and military equipment and are receiving highly skilled specialists, of particular timeliness is Lenin's advice: "Study military affairs properly."

And the Army and Navy political workers are steadily improving their military and technical knowledge. Many of them are high-class specialists and they realize that a personal example is the most effective agitation and for this reason along with the commanders organize service on the ground, in the air and under water, and participate in the working out of complex solutions. This undoubtedly not only significantly increases their authority but at the same time has an enormous indoctrinational significance. Certainly the appeals of such persons gain great mobilizing force if they themselves have an expert knowledge of the equipment and weapons, its combat capabilities and combat tactics.

For example, recently during missile firings Capt-Lt P. Monastyrskiy showed expert skills. Under a difficult situation of a cruise, he not only was the organizer of party political work. His own actions in servicing the military equipment were highly praised by the commander. Need it be said that this further increased his authority.

In the Army and Navy there are many such militarily well-trained political workers. Profound ideological conviction and high military skills allow them to carry out political work more concretely and to promptly and correctly isolate the main factors in the struggle to improve vigilance and combat readiness and better the ideological-political, military and moral indoctrination of the personnel. At the same time this gives the political cadres the moral right to make stricter demands upon subordinates and fellow servicemen. Their advice, recommendations, comments and proposals assume a different weight.

But, unfortunately, instances are encountered where individual political workers let up on the demands placed on themselves and do not pay proper attention to their own personal military and professional preparation. Understandably the word of such persons loses its mobilizing force and their authority in the collective is low.

Something similar to this happened with Maj V. Drobot who until recently was serving in one of the artillery units of the Southern Group of Forces. The officer gave himself an easy time at first and then ceased to work at all. And the farther it went the worse it was. Failures in service appeared after the failures in studies. And soon his authority in the collective was shaken. This fact shows how important it is to critically approach an assessment of one's activities, to constantly improve one's political and military knowledge and be an example of exemplary service for all.

As is known, an old accomplishment likes a new one. Hence it is not enough to have authority rather this must be constantly maintained by one's labor and conduct and, even more importantly, by one's very way of life. And a majority of the Army and Navy political workers profoundly understand this truth. They steadily instill in themselves inner control, a feeling of responsibility and a desire to be an example in everything, to get closer to the men and work constantly with them. As is rightly said: As you are with people so they are with you. Party work is work with people and this is repaid a hundred-fold. Let me give an example. A political worker in one of the subunits of the Leningrad Military District, Maj A. Korenevich, in his activities endeavored to reach each man and he knew, as is said, whose boots were tight and when. And the men always turned to this political worker and sought him out with their joys and disappointments. Even when dismissed into the reserves, they did not forget their senior chief and mentor.

"...I want to share a joy with you," wrote Pfc (Res) N. Aliyev. "I have joined the party, I have entered the first ranks of the fighters for communism and I promise to carry out with honor the high title of a communist. The army taught me this and I will never forget it."

From various ends of the nation come greetings to the political worker from his former subordinates. And in each of them are words of gratitude to the man who put a particle of his own generous heart in the noble deed of indoctrinating the men.



They see in the officer their political leader, a simple, accessible and charming man who is able to be concerned with them, to inspire them and lead them.

And here the words of the outstanding pedagogue A. S. Makarenko come to mind: "If anyone asked me how I would briefly define the essence of my pedagogical experience, I would reply that the more demands made on a person the more one can respect him."

To be constantly in the midst of the men, to sensitively pick up on their moods and by a personal example and inspiring word to mobilize them to effectively carry out the tasks confronting the units and ships--this is precisely what defines the person of a political worker and his reputation.

As is known, the authority of a leader is largely determined by how he has mastered the Leninist style of work. A Leninist style, as was pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, "is a creative style which is alien to subjectivism and is permeated by a scientific approach to all social processes. It presupposes great exactingness on oneself and others, it excludes complacency and resists any manifestations of bureaucracy and formalism." Specific recommendations, proposals and instructions on improving the style of party work have been given in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination."

There was a major discussion of the force of the indoctrinator's influence on those being indoctrinated at the conference of the command and political leadership of the Army and Navy in June of last year. In his speech, the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Arm Gen A. A. Yepishev, emphasized: "We give primary significance to the indoctrination of the indoctrinators. For every word, every gesture and action of the leader is carefully watched by the personnel. And if a person in a responsible position shows all the qualities of a true communist such as ideological loyalty, a profound knowledge of his job, exactingness for himself and subordinates and at the same time human charm, sensitivity, humility and simplicity, then the men under his leadership are ready to surmount any difficulties and carry out what at times would seem the impossible."

In speaking about the reputation of a deputy commander for political affairs, one cannot help but mention that according to the Instructions to the CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, he organizes party political work and bears responsibility for its state. And for this, as is known, it is essential to go deeply into the practical activities of the party organizations, to systematically instruct, train and indoctrinate the party aktiv and together with the party committee, the party bureau and the secretary of the party organization organize the carrying out of the party decisions and the tasks confronting the collective of communists.

There is much that is instructive in this regard in the work of the deputy commander for political affairs, Capt V. Gavrilenko. In the course of the past reports and elections of the party and Komsomol bodies, he made certain that the best men, the most qualified specialists, active volunteer workers and principled comrades were elected to the party bureau and Komsomol committee. Subsequently the political worker met constantly with the aktiv and instructed it, he organized its training well, he helped compile sound work plans and took a direct part in organizing their fulfillment. This made it possible for him to provide a constant party political influence on all aspects of the life and activities of the troop collective. This had a positive effect upon the affairs of the subunit and on raising the activeness of the men in the pregress socialist competition.

As is known, political work is not a simple matter, and it is delicate and many-faceted. For this reason an attentive attitude toward the political workers, particularly young ones, a study of their abilities, their level of preparation, their attitude toward the assigned job and the ability to organize and indoctrinate the men should be a constant duty of all the political bodies, senior chiefs and personnel bodies. It is essential to constantly instruct the political workers in the forms and methods of party political work. Well organized professional studies bring great benefit to all the political workers, but these are particularly essential and useful for young political workers. And here it is important that at the very outset of the activities of those who are taking their first steps in this profession, the political bodies in a sincere manner thoroughly analyze their successes and failures. They should be told in detail how to effectively organize their work in the future. And particular attention should be given to disclosing the forms of party political work in the field, at the range, at firing ranges, during exercises, in sea exercises and during flights.

Here it must not be forgotten that the concern for the development of the political workers is not a campaign but rather a matter requiring constant attention from the political bodies of all levels. In being in the units and subunits, the officers from the political directorates and sections should always find time for talking with the political workers. They should be interested in their affairs and plans, delve more deeply into their needs and requests and show constant concern for their everyday life. All of this should become an indispensable rule for the senior comrades and each political body.

The party has entrusted the political worker with a responsible position of being a political leader and organizer. This is the greatest honor and at the same time an enormous responsibility. For this reason, he must always remember his duty--party, service and human. "Without the steady carrying out of this duty," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, "without the ability to link word and deed by a strong drivebelt there is not and cannot be a true party and soviet worker. Great industry and discipline, exactingness on oneself and unassailable honesty--this is the basis of his good reputation. And this reputation must be maintained by all his life."

In these words of great import are to be found a combat program for the activities of each Army and Navy political worker. And the person who always and in everything behaves as an active political fighter as an indefatigable proponent of party policy in the Armed Forces inevitably has high authority and influence in the masses of servicemen and has a mobilizing influence on the life, studies and service of the men and on their work of ensuring the high vigilance and combat readiness of the units and formations.

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## **ARMED FORCES**

### **ROLE OF PEOPLE'S CONTROLLERS DISCUSSED**

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNIKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 81 (signed to press 5 Jan 81) pp 55-59

[Article by Lt Gen I. Sviridov: "The Work of the People's Controllers on a Level of the New Demands"]

[Text] Our party and the entire Soviet nation are on the threshold of a major event, the next 26th CPSU Congress. The Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990" which has been published for nation-wide discussion has caused a new enormous influx of force and energy in the Soviet people.

Our party has consistently and purposefully embodied the Leninist principles of socialist control in the unified and integrated carrying out of the most important national economic tasks. Of fundamental importance is the incorporation of provisions on people's control in the new USSR Constitution. The Law Governing People's Control in the USSR approved at the 2nd Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 30 November 1979 and the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Measures to Further Improve the Work of the People's Control Bodies and Strengthen Party Leadership Over Them in Line with the Approval of the Law Governing People's Control in the USSR" are a program of concrete action raising the work of the people's control bodies to a higher level. These documents embody Lenin's ideas on mass, ubiquitous, public and effective control. The law and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee are aimed at obtaining broader support for people's control from the party bodies so that the multimillion army of people's controllers be more actively involved in the general struggle to raise the level and quality of carrying out the plan quotas and to further increase the economic and defense potential of our state.

On the basis of the law and the decree of the party Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers has approved a regulation governing the procedure for implementing the activities of the people's control bodies in the USSR Armed Forces. This reflects the place of these bodies in the unified system of state and public control, their tasks, rights and duties are clearly formulated, and the forms and methods of work are defined considering the missions being carried out by the troops. The particular features of setting up people's control committees in the Army and Navy are also established. These are to be organized by a decision of the corresponding military councils (political bodies). The people's control groups are



elected for a term of 2-3 years by open voting at a general assembly of the personnel of a formation, troop unit (ship), facility, military school, enterprise or organization. The people's control posts are formed in subunits in the same manner.

The regulation provides that the committees, groups and posts operating in the Armed Forces are part of the unified system of people's control bodies in the USSR and work under the leadership of the military councils, the corresponding commanders (chiefs) and political bodies. At the same time, their activities are directed by the superior people's control bodies. This substantially raises the role of the district (fleet) and other people's control committees and groups of the formations, enterprises and organizations and requires great organizational work from them.

The putting into effect of documents which regulate the work of the people's control bodies in the Army and Navy necessitates greater activity by all the people's controllers and a substantial rise in their role and authority and the effectiveness of the checks.

Practice indicates that the committees, groups and posts more successfully handle their duties the more skilled and specific the leadership provided over their activities by the commanders, political bodies and party organizations.

Convincing proof of this is the work of the people's controllers in the formation where they are headed by Lt Col S. Smirnov. Here the commander and the political body give constant attention to improving the leadership of the groups and posts, viewing the activities of the communists in these bodies as the carrying out of an important assignment. The party organizations together with the commanders organize the work of the people's controllers and carefully watch that the communists who are members of the people's control groups and posts perform their duties conscientiously with their inherent principledness and professionalism. Exercises and instruction sections are held systematically with the controllers and the exchange of experience is organized. All of this helps to increase the effectiveness of their work.

It is also important that the political section generalize the actual work of the commanders and party organizations in leading the groups and posts and be concerned for raising their role in checking the actual execution of the party and government decisions and the orders and directives of the USSR minister of defense and in indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of high organization, efficiency and discipline. The state of the work of the people's control bodies and their leadership are regularly discussed at meetings of the leadership, in the political section and party organizations.

The people's control committees and head groups must help actively in further improving the forms and methods of control activities. They work out the uniform questions and programs for mass checks and the procedural recommendations and quotas, they generalize the results of these checks, they report their conclusions and proposals to the appropriate military councils, commanders and political bodies and work to eliminate the disclosed shortcomings.

The nature and scope of the organizational work carried out by the people's control bodies can be judged from the following data obtained in studying their activities



in the units, enterprises and organizations of the Transbaykal Military District. During last year, they made a significant number of checks, including many jointly with the bodies of the judge advocate office and the trade union organizations. In discussing the results of the checks at meetings, a large number of explanations by the guilty parties was heard and decisions were taken with recommendations to the chiefs of the services and the commanders of the subunits for eliminating the shortcomings. Moreover, in accord with the proposals of the people's controllers, orders were issued by the unit commanders on the materials of the checks.

The Law Governing People's Control and the Regulation demand that the activities of the people's control bodies themselves be carried out in strict accord with Soviet legislation, the military regulations and the orders of the USSR minister of defense. An important condition for carrying out this demand is a collective discussion in the people's control bodies of the results of the checks as well as the measures aimed at preventing and eliminating the shortcomings and proposals on the responsibility of persons who have committed violations. For this reason it is no accident that a procedure has been instituted whereby the results of the checks are reviewed either at the committee sessions and group assemblies or at sessions of their bureaus. When necessary the people's control committees, groups and posts work in contact with the judge advocate bodies. The forms of such contacts can be joint checks, reciprocal information, the reviewing of questions on the holding of officials responsible under the materials of the people's control bodies, participation of the military lawyers in the training of the people's controllers and so forth. In certain garrisons of the Pacific Fleet and the Transbaykal Military District, specific measures are carried out by the people's control bodies and the judge advocate offices under a single plan. The coordinated joint work helps to create a situation of intolerance for infractions of state discipline, for mismanagement and wasting of military property.

In increasing the activities of all the people's control bodies, of fundamental significance is the legal reinforcing of the rights of the committees, groups and posts as well as the duties of the command and political bodies in leading them. The committees, groups and posts have been granted the right, in carrying out the checks, to be acquainted with documents and materials on the studied question. With the permission of the appropriate commander or chief they can involve in the checks specialists and workers from the control and auditing personnel. They also have the right to sit in on explanations relating to the results of the check given by officials who are to blame for the nonfulfillment of the production plans and quotas or who are guilty of violating state and production discipline, bureaucracy and red tape, mismanagement and wastefulness, abuses and other violations. For the results of the checks, the people's control bodies submit proposals to prevent and eliminate the disclosed shortcomings and to institute proceedings against the responsible persons for review by the appropriate military councils, commanders and chiefs, political bodies and public organizations.

Certain people's control bodies in the Moscow, Carpathian and other military districts have gained a good deal of experience in the skillful use of their rights. At the center of their attention are the questions of the effective use of the training facilities, the economic expenditure of the resources allocated for the support of the life and activities of the troops as well as other problems relating to their competence.

In accord with the plans approved by the military councils of the districts, here they systematically check the storage and safekeeping of weapons and military equipment, the organization of their operation and repair and the correct maintenance and use of training facilities in the units and at the training centers. Also under constant control are the consumption of fuel and energy resources, the quality of overhauls on motor vehicles used for crop harvesting, and the condition of trade and consumer services for the personnel and servicemen families. The results of the checks are generalized and discussed in the people's control committees and are reported to the corresponding commanders, political bodies, party committees and bureaus. Orders are issued on a number of questions raised by the people's controllers. A majority of the people's control groups have noticeably improved the quality of checks, they have begun to more profoundly study the reasons for the shortcomings and more sharply assess the negative phenomena and have intensified preventive work.

Control, as is known, is a crucial area of work. Obviously a principled position of the people's controllers is not to the liking of everyone. However, no one can impede their work or follow a path of concealing shortcomings, embellishing the true situation or persecuting the activists. The CPSU Central Committee demands that such actions be decisively prevented, that the authority of the people's controllers be raised, that they be given the greatest possible help in their work and the honor and dignity of these persons protected. Support for them should come primarily from the commanders, political bodies, party committees and bureaus. Precisely this is what is done in our leading troop collectives.

The people's control bodies must carry out their duties very responsibly. However, in certain units and organizations, the level of the work of the controllers and its effectiveness still do not meet the demands made, the increased scale or the more complicated tasks being carried out by the Armed Forces. How is this manifested? The checks are not always carefully prepared for and at times are carried out superficially. For this reason they help little in disclosing the causes of the existing shortcomings and their elimination.

Shortcomings in the activities of the individual people's control bodies are often explained by poor familiarization on the part of the activists with the principles of this responsible and difficult matter. And it is a good thing if the political bodies, party committees and bureaus organize planned training for the members of the committees, groups and posts and study with them the party and government decrees, the orders and directives of the USSR Minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and other leading documents. It is also important at the training-pedagogical courses, seminars and exercises with the people's controllers to more often discuss the forms and methods of control, the results of concrete checks and the organization of follow-up control over the carrying out of decisions taken under the checks and the eliminating of detected shortcomings.

The interests of the matter demand the prompt spotting, generalization and disclosing of the most effective procedures in the work of the people's controllers. The advanced experience of the groups and posts develops out of the experience of the individual people's controllers, that is, the officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"], sergeants, soldiers, and employees, out of their creative searches and practical deeds. As a result this experience gains social significance. Hence

it is essential to propagandize the experience of the people who show initiative and creativity in performing their social duties.

For example, the unit commander, Officer V. Mil'kov, uses every opportunity to support the reasonable initiative of those people's controllers whose proposals are aimed at raising combat readiness. He personally maintains contact with the chairman and members of the people's control group and responds directly to the results of the checks. In this troop unit they make it a practice to systematically discuss the questions raised by the people's control group at meetings. The party bureau invites the people's controllers to its sessions in order to discuss their work practices, to comment on the achieved level and give new assignments.

The political section has generalized and disseminated the work experience of the people's control group where Maj I. Dron' was recently the chairman. This group consists of seven communists and four Komsomol members. When the group was set up, a majority of its members did not have work experience, however with the aid of the party bureau headed by Sr Lt V. Kuznetsov and the deputy commander for political affairs, Maj S. Gizhdevan, the group has become the best in the formation. The checks which are conducted by these people's controllers are marked by high results. The group members with the participation of specialist officers this year checked the storage and use of the ZIP (spare parts kit) and the military equipment in a number of subunits and was concerned with the questions of the upkeep of weapons and the careful expenditure of motor life and fuel, materials and money allocated for the needs of combat training. They reported their proposals to the unit commander and the party bureau secretary. As a rule, the results of the work done by the people's controllers have been discussed at a session of the party bureau, while the unit commander in his orders has obliged the commanders and political workers of the subunits, the staff and the chiefs of the services to take measures to institute proper order in the accounting, safekeeping and reasonable use of material and monetary resources.

As a result of the past reports and elections, in the people's control bodies the number of volunteer controllers in the Army and Navy has risen by 23 percent, and their ranks have been filled out with new workers. At present, one out of every two is a communist and one out of every three is a Komsomol member. It is very important to help the elected comrades master the skills of planning and carrying out control.

Particular significance is being assumed by the demand on the Army and Navy people's controllers to become principled, intolerant of shortcomings, to set an example of military discipline, to strictly observe state and military secrets and to ensure the indisputable reliability of the materials of the checks and the soundness of the conclusions. The necessary guarantees have been established for their successful work, and in accord with them the commanders and political bodies must halt any attempts to resist the people's controllers in their activities and encourage persons who work well. Upon a petition from the appropriate committees and groups, the most outstanding ones are to be granted an additional paid leave of up to 3 days a year.

More concern must also be shown for strengthening the publicizing of control and informing the troop and labor collectives of the work done by the committees, groups and posts and the results of the checks. For this purpose it is advisable to make



wider use of the meetings of the personnel of the troop units, ships and subunits, the labor collectives of the production enterprises and the service meetings. The military press can also pay more attention to this sphere of public activity.

It would be advisable to organize a study of the Regulation on the Procedure for Carrying Out the Activities of the People's Control Bodies in the USSR Armed Forces as promulgated on the basis of the Law Governing People's Control in the USSR by the commanders and chiefs, by the party, Komsomol and trade union aktiv and by the members of the people's control committees, groups and posts. It is important to do everything to further raise the level of leadership over the people's control bodies and to improve their work in light of the demands of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee. Here it is important to always consider the well-known instructions of V. I. Lenin that "the task of the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate is not only and not so much 'to catch' or 'disclose'...as it is to be able to correct."

The people's controllers in the Armed Forces operate as a large social force which actively aids the commanders, political bodies and party organizations in solving many questions of combat readiness and the life and activities of the troops. The tasks presently confronting the army people's control bodies urgently require an improvement in their leadership, a bettering of the forms and methods of control and a rise in its effectiveness. The work being done by the people's controllers is aimed at successfully carrying out the missions confronting the Armed Forces.

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## ARMED FORCES

### TRAINING METHODS IN THE ODESSA MD

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 81 (signed to press 5 Jan 81) pp 60-65

[Article by Lt Gen P. Fomichev, member of the military council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Odessa Military District: "Advanced Experience into Troop Practices"]

[Text] With a feeling of filial pride and with profound interest the personnel of the district is studying and discussing the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990." The magnificent plans of the party for communist construction and its constant concern for the ever fuller satisfying of the material and spiritual needs of the Soviet people have found a vital response in the hearts of the men and have inspired the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and officers to intense military service to further improve the combat readiness of the units and subunits. The commanders, political bodies and staffs, the party and Komsomol organizations are using the patriotic upsurge and political activeness of the men to further improve the quality and efficiency of the training and indoctrination process and to strengthen military discipline and proper order.

Life convincingly confirms the irrefutable truth that the quality and effectiveness of military and political training to a large degree depend upon how the units and formations generalize and introduce advanced experience. Its importance is hard to overestimate. It embodies the models of high professional and pedagogical skill of the commanders and political workers and the staff officers, their organizational abilities, the rational methods and procedures of work and the scientific organization of military service. Experience also embodies the profound knowledge and lasting skills of the men which make it possible to gain a maximum from the combat capabilities to be found in the weapons and equipment. Advanced experience is our main reserve the realization of which makes it possible to move ahead confidently and gain more in raising the combat readiness of the troops.

If one runs over in one's mind the activities of the district troops over the period between the two party congresses and objectively assesses this, then the conclusion grows that there have been definite changes for the better in the study and introduction of advanced experience. In the process of military and political training, in training-procedural assemblies, seminars and service conferences, in

the analyses of exercises and at party and Komsomol meetings, more attention has begun to be paid to the generalizing of the positive features which are actually worthy of borrowing and dissemination. There has been a turn from the eulogizing of the leaders to a professional study of their style and methods of work. The desire, in using Lenin's words, of "studying from the good" is steadily making headway.

The military council, the political directorate and the staff of the district have supported and developed this desire and have been concerned that advanced experience be introduced into troop practices. We have begun to show greater interest in advanced work procedures in those troop collectives which have achieved positive results in carrying out the tasks of further strengthening discipline and raising the effectiveness of studies, vigilance and combat readiness. We endeavor to give an objective assessment to all that is valuable and positive and which enriches the training and indoctrinational process and party political work.

This was the case, for example, when we studied and analyzed the ways for achieving steady high results in military and political training as attained by our outstanding units where Officers L. Makhlay and N. Veligan serve. After a thorough discussion, the members of the district military council isolated and recommended for introduction in all the troop collectives the practically tested procedures of their fruitful work. For example, such ones as ensuring the intensification and effectiveness of military training by the integrating of various training subjects with tactics; the comprehensive solving of questions of combat skills, moral-political and psychological training and physical conditioning of the men by creating a situation close to actual combat in the tactical exercises, firing and tank firing training drills, the use of complicated variations for carrying out firing problems, and so forth.

Also effective is the practice introduced in recent years of holding assemblies for the command and political personnel directly in the advanced units and formations where their participants have an opportunity to learn rational work methods from the very creators of this experience.

The report and election party meetings in the primary organizations and the party conferences of the units, formations and the district played an important role in disseminating advanced experience in party political work and an integrated approach to organizing the entire question of indoctrination of the personnel. Even in the period of the preparations for the report and election campaign, in an instructional exercise with the chiefs of the political bodies and in a seminar with the party committee and bureau secretaries, the political directorate oriented them to the unconditional carrying out of the demand of the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on the need to carefully approach all the positive that is to be found in our work and to critically look at the omissions and shortcomings. And it must be said that in a predominant majority of the party organizations, in the reports and speeches by the communists an exacting analysis of party work and the state of affairs was organically combined with careful propagandizing of the acquired experience of the political impact on the conscience of the men and the mobilizing of them for intense and fruitful military service.

In particular, in the party organization where Maj V. Ponomarev is the party bureau secretary, in the course of the report and election meeting, the experience of party political work was thoroughly disclosed in ensuring a high quality of combat training for the personnel. This work was organized in terms of the specific tasks of combat training. Its core was made up of an explaining to the personnel of the party's policy and demands and the struggle for the personal example set by the communists and the extending of political influence to each man. The party bureau and committee in all their indoctrinational and organizational practices placed increased demands on the communists who were leaders of the exercises and staff officers, upon the organizing of exercises, drills and training by them and upon the high quality execution of the training plans and programs. They came out fundamentally against concessions and oversimplification, complacency and a nonobjective assessment of the state of affairs in the subunits. Particular attention was given to studying and generalizing advanced experience and to introducing it into practice. For example, the experience of such pedagogues as communists I. Gribenko, N. Karamanov and S. Loskutov was made available to all the officers.

In having a good knowledge of the content of the combat training missions, they ably organized the competition for the outstanding execution of these tasks and for surpassing the norms. They ensured true competitiveness for the best results in tactical, firing and technical training. They conducted the training and indoctrination of subordinates in an inseparable unity, in constantly explaining to the men that their military service was as essential to the socialist state as the work of a worker or kolkhoz member and that this service was aimed at ensuring the security of the motherland.

The advanced experience generalized at the party meetings and conferences helped the communists understand more profoundly that success in the struggle for high effectiveness of combat training is largely dependent upon the effectiveness of political, military and moral indoctrination of the personnel and that the party's concern for the carrying out of the training plans and programs should be combined for concern about the men carrying them out.

We orient the generals and officers of the district staff and directorates at personal involvement in generalizing and introducing advanced experience in organizing and improving the methods of military and political training, the competition and party political work. Being in the units, at tactical exercises, in being present in the carrying out of gunnery problems or flights--wherever military mastery is being formed--on a basis of a detailed study of the style and methods of work of the commanders, political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations, they generalize all the best and carefully analyze and establish whether in fact the experience is advanced, whether it conforms to the requirements of today and merits dissemination. The generals and officers of the district staffs and directorates support and introduce into the troops all that does not repeat the old and which helps in the high quality carrying out of the tasks and the development of the creative abilities of the men.

It must be said that the district political directorate and the staff together with the commanders, political bodies and party organizations of the units and formations have done significant work in introducing in the troop collectives such patriotic initiatives of the personnel as the struggle to hit targets at maximum ranges



and the first shot, launch or first burst; for completing each training day with an excellent result; for the ability to operate military equipment at night according to daytime standards. Long-range planning of the training and indoctrinational process is being actively introduced and providing good results in the regiments. This involves determining the specific goals, paths and methods for achieving the end results and the implementing of all that was planned chiefly in the subunits.

Many generals and officers from the district staff and directorates, and primarily those such as Comrades P. Shavelkin, S. Subbotin, M. Nosenko, Ya. Pan'kin and Ye. Tsigikalov, are well known in the troops, they frankly share the successes and failures with them and seek their advice. These comrades, in going deeply into the state of affairs, arm the commanders and political workers with advanced experience and help them eliminate the bottlenecks in military and political training.

For example, in working in one of the troop units, a group of officers from the district staff and political directorate headed by Gen M. Nosenko made a detailed investigation into the organization of the training and indoctrination process, the competition and party political work. They discovered much that was positive. For example, they highly praised the method of integrating various types of combat training and the organizing of the competition according to missions and norms. Their attention was also attracted by the active and effective party political work and by the extending of a political influence to each man by the well thought out placement of the communists and the Komsomol aktiv in the tactical drills and field exercises. The officers from the staff and political directorate then began to introduce the valuable experience in the subunits of the unit where Officer V. Nesterov serves and where there were flaws in field skills. In particular, demonstration exercises were held on tactical and gunnery training and seminars for the party and Komsomol aktiv. Help was provided in organizing the training and indoctrination process and party political work in ensuring the high activeness of the personnel. And the state of affairs in field skills changed for the better here.

Many such examples could be given. Practice shows that the joint work of officers from the staffs and political bodies makes it possible to widely introduce advanced training and indoctrination experience and more successfully overcome the difficulties and shortcomings. As a result, party political work, as a rule, becomes more specific and effective and more closely linked to solving the problems of military training.

As is known the commander is to act as the organizer of diverse work in generalizing and practically employing advanced experience. This is his official duty as defined by the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces: "...to study and introduce into practice all that is new and advanced and helping to raise the effectiveness of training and indoctrinating subordinates...." The commanders have an opportunity to pool the efforts of their deputies, the staff officers and specialists from various services for this and to rely on the aid of the political workers and party organizations. And those of them who so organize their work in the area of generalizing and introducing advanced experience achieve good results.

Indicative in this regard are the activities of Officer V. Kondrat'yev. Inherent to him is a considerate, thoughtful attitude toward all that is advanced which arises in the course of training days. He works in close contact with the political

worker and party organization. By common efforts they introduce into practice all that helps to raise the quality of combat training. Thus, when Officers V. Borisov and P. Yelchev, experienced specialists, made a valuable proposal, they were actively supported by the commander. Upon his initiative, a group of able workers was set up and in a short period of time this carried out the idea of the innovators. This made it possible to surpass by 15-20 percent the standards for combat work and improve the teamwork of the crews. Here for disseminating experience they make skillful use of the competitions for the title of best specialist, speeches by masters of military skills to the servicemen and demonstration exercises and training conducted by the best pedagogues. As a result the men carried out the combat training tasks and received an excellent grade. The experience of the commander and political section from this unit was generalized by the district political directorate and the leadership of the other troop collectives was informed of it.

It should be pointed out that in recent years the influence of the political bodies and staff party organizations has risen on developing the activities of the commanders and staff officers in the area of introducing advanced experience. For example, there is much that is positive in the staff party organization where Maj V. Gyabin is the secretary. Here the communists at a meeting discussed their tasks in the area of generalizing and propagandizing advanced experience. Many of them assumed socialist obligations to disseminate effective procedures for organizing training in the subunits. Later the party organization heard statements by the CPSU members Comrades P. Makeychik and V. Chudin on how they were carrying out these obligations. For the purpose of introducing advanced training and indoctrination methods, the communists N. Galuz, N. Kobets, Ye. Breslavskiy and others, on the basis of the best subunits, conducted demonstration exercises in the course of which the officers were shown how high effectiveness is achieved in tank firing drills as well as expert driving of the vehicles. They also organized speeches by the leading specialists. The staff communists regularly give lectures and reports in which they propagandize advanced experience.

The district political directorate endeavors to make everything that is valuable and instructive in party political work available to the chiefs of the political bodies, the deputy commanders for political affairs, the party and Komsomol activists at meetings and seminars as well as through the district newspaper ZASHCHITNIK RODINY. For example, at meetings for the political section chiefs they reviewed the experience of the party political personnel of the units in which the political workers, Officers V. Lagoda and S. Mishchuk, serve, in the area of carrying out the demands of the USSR minister of defense on raising the role of commander training. What is the essence of this? That the political section and party committee, by the forms and methods inherent to them, and chiefly by strengthening political work with the leadership, constantly achieve an improvement in commander training. There is also the question of the constant observance of the periodicity and dates for holding training and procedural assemblies and exercises with the officers and the influence on their content and quality. In these units, at the assemblies and exercises, along with increasing professional and tactical training, the officers exchange experience in organizing political, military and moral indoctrination of the subordinates and experience in the strengthening of military discipline and proper order. Here in commander training active forms of instruction are introduced making it possible for the officers not only to deepen their theoretical knowledge but also practical skills in carrying out their functional duties.

The socialist competition opens up broad opportunities for introducing the new and instructive in life. The practical repetition of advanced experience, as is known, is provided for by the Leninist principles for organizing this experience. And where the commanders, the political bodies and the party activists steadfastly carry out these principles and are constantly concerned with specific indoctrinational and organizational work with the men, here experience does not remain a dead weight.

For example, take the guards formation which has led steadily in the socialist competition to properly greet the 26th CPSU Congress. In the leading collective, a true struggle has been initiated for the profound mastery of the weapons and equipment and for excellent mastery of the combat specialties. Here a spirit of lively competitiveness is inherent to each exercise regardless of where it is carried out, that is, in the classroom, on the range, the firing range or tank driving field. In the process of such an exercise the men, squads, crews and subunits are disclosed which have achieved the best results in military service. On a basis of analyzing data on the fulfillment of firing, driving or actions by the personnel in the tactical exercises, the officers from the political section and the staff determine the precise "addresses" of the advanced experience and plan their work in disseminating it. For example, they generalized the experience of the commander of the outstanding company, Sr Lt Yu. Okherzin, and the commander of the outstanding tank platoon, Sr Lt S. Shchelokov, in ensuring high effectiveness of the exercises. And in the procedural training assemblies, their experience was made available to all the officers.

Instructive for the comrades in arms was the demonstration exercise carried out according to the staff's plan by Sr Lt M. Gayjay during which the tasks of gunnery and tactical training were carried out as a single unit. Firing was carried out against a difficult tactical background, in a situation as close as possible to actual combat. In the crews the competition was well organized to surpass the standards and hit the targets with the first rounds. Party political work was carried out actively in all stages.

Lecture series and schools for advanced experience operate productively in the units of this formation. These are led by militarily well-trained officers. The exercises are carried out on a differentiated basis with the various categories of servicemen.

Reciprocal visits by the commanders, political workers, engineer and technical specialists, party and Komsomol activists from the leading adjacent units play an important role in the study and dissemination of advanced experience. Unfortunately, the officers often learn of the experience of neighbors only in meetings, seminars and conferences. But it is still rather rare when on their own initiative they go to a different collective for becoming acquainted with positive experience.

This is why we are doing so much so that the competition gives rise to a desire and aspiration for the officers to catch up with and adopt the best procedures for organizing the training and indoctrinational process, allowing an opportunity in a short period of time to effectively carry out the tasks of training not only individual specialists but also developing teamwork among the subunits and units. And this is very beneficial. "The leadership of the competition and the introduction



of the new and progressive are a vital matter which does not tolerate stagnation and conservatism," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. This instruction underlies the work of the commanders, political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations in the district.

From all that has been said it in no way follows that everything goes smoothly for us, without a hitch or any problems. There still are unused reserves and not everyone is able to utilize valuable experience correctly and efficiently. Unfortunately, there are instances when individual commanders, political workers and leaders of the party collectives at best give the names of the leading officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers, but say little about their experience. In practice instances are still encountered when the party organizations adopt generally good decisions on introducing advanced experience, but reduce all their work to carrying out general measures and do not analyze how various experience has helped to achieve high end results.

There is no doubt about it, the dissemination of advanced experience and its introduction into practice are a difficult matter entailing significant organizational difficulties and for this reason requires steadfastness, decisiveness and boldness. But at times the individual commanders and political workers lack this. A discussion of the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990" in the party and Komsomol organizations and the troop collectives has had a beneficial influence on our work in generalizing and introducing advanced experience. The very spirit of this most important document impels the communists and all the men to seek out unutilized opportunities and reserves for improving the quality and effectiveness of all work and in introducing advanced experience into practice to achieve a further intensification of the training process and greater effectiveness from the indoctrinational process.

The district personnel live by the same life and by the same thoughts as the Soviet people. The men see their filial duty in maintaining the vigilance and combat readiness of the units and formations on a level of the party's requirements in the current difficult international situation. Their intense and inspired military service is aimed at the excellent carrying out of the tasks of the winter training period and the socialist obligations assumed in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress. The commanders and political workers, the staff officers, the party and Komsomol activists and all the servicemen are well aware that the better they use advanced experience, the more successful their advance will be toward the set goals of combat mastery and the better the personnel of the district will carry out its patriotic duty to securely defend the socialist fatherland.

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## ARMED FORCES

### DISCIPLINE TRAINING IN THE BELORUSSIAN MD

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 81 (signed to press 5 Jan 81) pp 66-68

[From a speech by Col I. Zayenchkovskiy, delegate at the party conference of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "Discipline--An Indispensable Condition for High Combat Readiness"]

[Text] With great inspiration, with a patriotic upsurge caused by the decisions of the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, by the grandiose prospects for the further flourishing of the nation as outlined by the party in the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990," the officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"], the sergeants and soldiers of the unit are working on carrying out their missions. They are steadily improving combat skills, they are steadily strengthening discipline and proper order and are raising combat readiness.

As is known, military discipline is one of the components of combat readiness.

During the time which has passed since the 25th CPSU Congress, the communists of the unit have done a good deal of work aimed at raising the effectiveness of the training process, strengthening discipline, and instituting and maintaining proper order in the subunits. We have troop collectives where for an extended time there have been no major military infractions. For example, take one of the subunits. Here the life and training of the men are carried out in strict accord with the requirements of the regulations, manuals, instructions, orders and commands. The subunit is rightly considered one of the best in the unit, and here modern training facilities have been created. The party organization actively aids the commander in organizing the training process and is concerned that the communists show great responsibility for carrying out the plan for military and political training and for maintaining firm order and indoctrinate the personnel in a spirit of efficiency. Here all the party members and candidate members set an example of discipline and organization in everything and provide an unflagging influence on fellow servicemen. They act against the violations of proper order from the standpoint of party exactingness and make a principled evaluation of unworthy deeds.

The high organization in all elements and the strong discipline significantly determine the successes of the men in this subunit. It completed the last training year with outstanding indicators. The subunit is in the leading ranks in the socialist competition which has developed to properly celebrate the 26th CPSU Congress.

However this cannot be said about all the subunits. At the last party meeting, for example, many criticisms were addressed to the subunit where Officer S. Yurkevich is party organization secretary. Here there still are instances of serious deviations from the requirements of the regulations. There are particularly many oversteps in the organization of troop services. The reason for such a situation lies primarily in the fact that the communists themselves have not shown any real feeling of high responsibility for this most important area of work. Some of them are generous in promises but miserly in deeds. From the rostrum of important meetings one can often hear them vow that they are making every effort to strengthen proper order. But time passes and everything remains as before. And here one cannot help but recall the words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev that at present what we need are not only words about discipline and not only appeals for order. What is most needed is painstaking daily organizational work.

For us the training program, plan and the daily regimen have the force of law. And this military law of ours should be unswervingly observed. Unfortunately, as an analysis of the results of the training year shows, individual commanders, staffs, party and Komsomol organizations have not seen to it that all the life and activities of the troop collectives be carried out in strict accord with the requirements of the regulations. At times one encounters facts when the combat training tasks were worked on poorly in a unit or subunit, the daily regimen was violated and the training facilities unprepared for the exercises. And there are also many talks about this at the service meetings and at the party meetings, but there is no improvement. As a member of the party bureau of the unit headquarters, I can say that our own experience shows that the party organizations possess a rich arsenal of means for influencing their members. A sharp and principled discussion of questions of the example set by the communists and their responsibility at meetings and bureau sessions, the hearing of reports by party members and candidate members on their carrying out of service and party duties and the all-round development of criticism and self-criticism--all of this effectively helps to develop in the communists an exacting attitude toward oneself and others.

The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" has opened a broad front of work for the party organizations. One of its demands is that there be a systematic, purposeful and unyielding struggle using all the means of propaganda and indoctrination--from discussion in a party organization and collective to criticism in the press--to eradicate such still frequently encountered perverted phenomena in our life as mismanagement, wastefulness, drunkenness, bureaucracy, an inconsiderate attitude toward people and infractions of discipline and order. As the decree states, it is essential to use both persuasion by word and the strict force of the law in combating these phenomena.

And it must be admitted that we often rely solely on administrative measures. But far from all of the communists have mastered the art of persuasion. It is quite



true that talks are held in the subunits and lectures are given on the requirements of our regulations and the military oath and on the essence of iron military discipline. But these talks and lectures often are of a general nature, they are little related to the life of the troop collectives and are not filled with party passion. And naturally they little touch the souls of the men.

Often measures are planned which are basically designed to "cover" all the men. But then the communists at times do not reach the individual and are little interested in his needs or mood. But the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee oriented us to an attentive, demanding and at the same time considerate attitude toward others.

At the report and election party meeting which was held in the unit headquarters, we spoke sharply and specifically of how the communists who are staff workers influence the course of combat training, the carrying out of training plans, orders and instructions of the commanders, the strengthening of military discipline and the maintaining of firm proper order in the unit subunits. It was emphasized that it is not enough to urge the men to be disciplined and efficient. They must be put under the conditions of a strict military way of life with the proper organization of the training and service of the men in the unit and subunit. We must see to it that the responsibility of each person for his personal conduct and for discipline in the collective is further raised. The conclusion was drawn that the staff communists must fight decisively against all that prevents the establishing of a precise rhythm of combat training, they must be the active supporters of military discipline, they must assess the instances of poor efficiency objectively and from the positions of party demandingness and decisively thwart attempts to conceal various shortcomings or represent the state of affairs in a subunit or unit in a better light.

But have we achieved this? As yet not. Individual staff officers, in working in the subunits, do not sufficiently analyze how the plans for military and political training are being carried out, they do not go deeply into the problems of strengthening discipline and organizing the service of the troops, they do not study the disciplinary practices of the officers and sergeants and at times merely record various violations. But certainly a staff officer is not a recorder of fact but rather an organizer of deeds. His duty is not only to disclose shortcomings but also to take measures to eliminate them, to help the man on the spot, to pass on to them bits of advanced experience and provide advice on how to better carry out the work. The party organizations in the staffs should establish precisely such a style. And it is a great pity that we speak very rarely about such a style of work at our party meetings and bureau sessions. And we are not always strict with those comrades who show a formal attitude toward their duties and are indifferent to various omissions in the organizing of training and service in the subunits.

I have spoken about a staff communist as an organizer. But obviously there are also grounds to speak about him as an indoctrinator. Certainly a communist, whatever position he may hold, remains a political fighter of the party. I must say frankly that on our staffs there are party members who are little concerned with the indoctrination of the men and under any pretext avoid participating in measures of a political indoctrination nature. I feel that the party organizations must be

more demanding on such comrades. They must more often remember the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the further improvement of ideological work. This demands that each communist, wherever he works, act as a propagandist and proponent of the ideas of the Leninist party and devote all his knowledge and all the strength of his soul to this exceptionally important matter.

The urgency of this requirement is particularly apparent now when the men of the Army and Navy are widely discussing the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990." We must help the men with all their heart accept the party's plans and respond by deeds to its decisions.

Important and responsible tasks confront us. The men of the unit's subunits, having strongly supported the patriotic initiative of the personnel from the leading units and the nuclear missile submarine, have actively joined the socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress under the motto "For High Combat Readiness and Firm Military Order!" The commanders, political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations by close, joint efforts are seeing to it that the training and indoctrination process and all the activities of the subunits have an active influence on developing in the officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers high efficiency, discipline, organization and personal responsibility for the unswerving observance of the Soviet laws, the military oath and regulations. We see this as the dependable guarantee that in the year of the 26th CPSU Congress, the combat readiness of the unit's subunits will rise to a qualitatively new level.

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## **ARMED FORCES**

### **INDOCTRINATION GUIDE ON USSR SOCIAL STRUCTURE**

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 81 (signed to press 5 Jan 81) pp 87-89

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col N. Mal'tsev: "The Unshakable Union of the Workers, Peasants and Intelligentsia"\*)]

[Text] The purpose of studying the given subject is to help the men in profoundly understanding the ideas of V. I. Lenin and the instructions of the Communist Party on the alliance of the workers and peasants in the socialist revolution and to show the growing significance of the unshakable union of the working class, the laboring peasantry and the people's intelligentsia for further strengthening the economic and defense might of our motherland and for raising the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces in the stage of developed socialism.

Six hours are devoted to studying the subject. This time should be allocated as follows: 2 hours for a lecture (narration), 2 assigned for independent work by the students and 2 hours for a seminar (talk).

In the lecture (narration) it is desirable to take up the following basic questions: 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the union of the working class and the peasantry in the struggle for the victory of the socialist revolution and its role in building socialism. 2. The CPSU and the USSR Constitution on the union of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia as the social basis of the Soviet state. 3. The significance of the unshakable union of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia for the defense of the socialist fatherland.

It is desirable to begin the lecture or the narration by a short introduction in which one should point out that the Soviet people, including the men of the Army and Navy, today labor in a situation of a great political upsurge. This has been caused by the nationwide discussion of the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990." In competing to properly celebrate the forthcoming

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\*Material for political exercises on the subject "The Unshakable Union of the Workers, Peasants and Intelligentsia--the Social Basis of the USSR and a Powerful Force for the Construction of Communism and Strengthening National Defense Capability."



26th Party Congress, the Soviet people are doing everything to further raise the economic and defense might of their socialist motherland. The men of the Armed Forces also live by the same thoughts and aspirations as all the workers. They are steadily strengthening discipline and organization and are improving their military skill, vigilance and combat readiness. The basis for all the successes of the Soviet people in communist construction and in further increasing the combat capability of the Soviet state is to be found in the tested leadership of the Leninist Communist Party and in the unshakable union of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia of our country.

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Union of the Working Class and the Peasantry in the Struggle for the Victory of the Socialist Revolution and Its Role in the Building of Socialism

The question of the union of the working class and the peasantry in the struggle for the victory of a socialist revolution and in building a new society is of fundamental significance. K. Marx and F. Engels repeatedly drew attention to the necessity of such a union. The founders of scientific communism pointed out that under capitalism the proletariat and peasantry are in an equally impoverished situation. The exploitation of a worker, they pointed out, differs from the exploitation of a peasant only in form. The exploiter in either instance is capital. "For this reason, the peasantry," wrote K. Marx, "finds its natural ally and leader in the urban proletariat which has the mission of overthrowing the bourgeois order" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," Vol 8, p 211).

V. I. Lenin developed and deepened these views of his inspired predecessors considering the new historical situation. He created an integrated and ordered teaching about the union of the working class and the peasantry as a most important condition for the victory of the socialist revolution and for the successful construction of a new society. "...The force capable of winning a 'decisive victory over tsarism'," he wrote, "can only be the people, that is, the proletariat and the peasantry.... No one else can win a decisive victory over tsarism" (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 11, p 44).

It is important that the propagandist explain in detail the essence of the basic Leninist provisions on the union of the working class and the peasantry and describe how indefatigably and consistently the Communist Party has struggled to strengthen this. In the idea of V. I. Lenin, the victory of a socialist revolution was impossible without a firm union between the workers and peasants. Such an alliance was vitally essential both for the proletariat and for the poorest peasantry, for they were equally interested in overthrowing the exploiting system and establishing worker power. Thus, the coinciding of the fundamental interests of the working class and the peasantry represented an effective basis for their revolutionary alliance.

Here the leading role is played by the proletariat. "As the sole completely revolutionary class of modern society," pointed out V. I. Lenin, "it should be the leader and dominant power in the struggle of all the people for a complete democratic changeover and in the struggle of all the workers and exploited against the suppressors and exploiters. The proletariat is revolutionary only to the degree that it is aware of and carries out this idea of hegemony" (PSS, Vol 20, p 308).

As V. I. Lenin taught, the development and strengthening of the union between the working class and the peasantry is carried out under the leadership of the revolutionary Marxist party of the proletariat.

The nature and particular features of this union depend upon the specific historical conditions of each country. V. I. Lenin pointed to the inevitability of changes in the composition of the allies of the working class as the revolution developed. In analyzing the tactics of the Bolsheviks in 1905 and 1907, Lenin pointed to the exceptional flexibility of the party vis-a-vis the peasantry. "Initially, along with 'all' the peasantry against the monarchy, against the landowners and against the Middle Ages (and to the degree that the revolution remains bourgeois or bourgeois democratic)," he wrote. "Then, together with the poorest peasantry, together with the semiproletariat, together with all the exploited, against capitalism, including against the village rich, the kulaks and speculators, as the revolution becomes a socialist one" (PSS, Vol 37, pp 311-312).

The history of the three revolutions in our nation has fully affirmed the viability of Lenin's teachings on the alliance of the working class and the working peasantry as a powerful force for social progress. Lenin's teachings on the union of the working class and the peasantry armed the party with a precise program of actions and pointed to the real revolutionary forces capable of overthrowing the rule of the landowners and capitalists in Russia and establishing worker power. Lenin's ideas on the union of workers and peasants underlay the strategy and tactics of the Bolsheviks. In the various stages of the revolutionary struggle, the party put forward precise, vital strategic slogans on the peasant question. In the democratic revolution it was the union of the proletariat with all the peasantry. In the socialist revolution it was a union with the poorest peasantry with the neutralization of the middle peasantry. In the struggle to consolidate Soviet power and for socialism it was a reliance on the poor, a firm alliance with the middle peasantry and a decisive struggle against the kulak.

Such a far-sighted policy of the party's ensured the soundness and permanency of the union of the workers and the peasants and was one of the decisive conditions for the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The proletariat gained the full support of the peasant poor which at that time was up to 65 percent of the rural population of Russia. Thus, the party achieved the main thing, a revolution which was proletarian in its content and at the same time profoundly popular. "In expressing the fundamental interests of an absolute majority of the nation's population," pointed out the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "the working class in an alliance with the working peasantry ensured the victory of the revolution and established its power. Following the revolution and the working class were the broadest masses of the working people and all the progressive persons of science and culture."

Our revolution and the experience of the revolutionary transition to socialism in a number of European and Asian countries are irrefutable proof that the union of the working class with the working peasantry and with the broadest strata of the population comprises one of the general patterns of a socialist revolution and an essential condition for the successful construction of socialism and communism.

As a result of the victory of Great October, the Russian proletariat was the first in the world to become a ruling class. Around it rallied all the workers of the city and the countryside, and above all the peasant poor. A state of the dictatorship of the proletariat was born, the power of the working class was born exercised in an alliance with all the working population for the purpose of building socialism. V. I. Lenin viewed the dictatorship of the proletariat as a particular form of the class alliance of the proletariat with the numerous nonproletarian strata of workers. The union of the workers and peasants was defined by him as the highest principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The construction of socialism by the Russian workers was commenced in an extremely complex and difficult situation. Life itself urgently required a further strengthening of the class solidarity of the workers and peasants and their militant revolutionary alliance. This was largely aided by our party's correct policy toward the peasantry. Its basic provisions were worked out upon the initiative of V. I. Lenin by the Eighth RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress which was held in March 1919. Its essence was to win over the middle peasantry to the side of Soviet power.

The importance of this question was determined by the following circumstance. A large portion of the poor and hired workers, having received land and supplies from the hands of Soviet power, had risen up to the level of the middle peasant. The middle peasantry became the most numerous stratum in the countryside producing the basic mass of agricultural product and socialism could be built successfully only in an alliance with them. For this reason the party, upon the proposal of V. I. Lenin, at its Eighth Congress adopted a decision on changing over to a policy of a strong alliance between the working class and the middle peasantry in relying on the poor peasantry for fighting against the kulaks.

By this time the kulaks remained the last exploiting class in the nation. They sabotaged all the measures of Soviet power and waged an active struggle against it. For this reason the party set out to fully eliminate the kulaks as a class. This party policy played an exceptionally important role in the further strengthening of Soviet power.

After the end of the Civil War, the Communist Party, in being guided by the instructions of V. I. Lenin, continued to improve the economic, sociopolitical and cultural-ideological ties between the city and countryside. In 1921, the New Economic Policy was introduced. Its basic feature was the constantly growing alliance between the working class and the working peasantry. "...The essence of the New Economic Policy," pointed out V. I. Lenin, "is an alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, its essence is a fusion of the vanguard, the proletariat, with the broad peasant field" (PSS, Vol 44, p 322). The New Economic Policy became the solely correct one in making the transition from capitalism to socialism under the conditions of our country. It ensured the successful carrying out of the tasks of the transitional period.

In working out a plan for building socialism in the USSR, V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party proceeded from the view that the nation had everything necessary and in sufficient amount for the victory of the new system. For this it was important to carry out industrialization, to organize cooperatives in agriculture and carry



out a cultural revolution. The embodiment of Lenin's ideas on the building of socialism in our nation was carried out on a basis of a close union of the working class and the peasantry. In the struggle for a new life this union was further developed and strengthened.

The working class was the leading force in the industrialization of the nation. It showed the greatest awareness and heroism. The labor feats of the finest representatives of the working class, commented Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "served as a powerful motor driving forward the entire cause of building the industrial base of socialism" ("Leninskii Kurs" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 2, p 86). The working peasantry supported the policy of industrialization by supplying the city with food and industry with raw materials and new members of the working class.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the working class involved the countryside in socialist construction and helped the working peasantry to consolidate the scattered single-family farms into collective ones. The forming of cooperatives for the rural workers became such a form for introducing the peasantry to socialism. Step by step the peasantry from its own experience became convinced of the advantages of production cooperation and of the need to convert to collective agriculture. Upon the party's appeal, thousands of workers went to the countryside and helped organize and set up a collective system. Here it is wise to give as an example the remarkable image of the worker and later the kolkhoz chairman, the communist Semen Davydov, the hero of the novel by M. Sholokhov "Virgin Lands Uplifted."

Under the leadership and with the direct participation of the working class, the peasantry irrevocably committed itself to socialism. Joined into kolkhozes, it became a powerful support for Soviet power in the countryside.

The victory of socialism in our nation as reinforced in the 1936 USSR Constitution led to profound changes in the class composition of the population with workers and white collar personnel comprising 45.7 percent of the nation's population, the kolkhoz peasantry and artisans organized in cooperatives were 48.8 percent, and the artisans not in cooperatives were 5.5 percent. Thus, the USSR had eliminated all exploiting classes. Now the new social structure included two friendly classes, the workers and peasants, as well as the working intelligentsia.

The intelligentsia was turned into a social stratum close in its nature and related to the working class and peasantry. Raised on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and in a spirit of loyalty to the ideals of communism, it devoted all its forces and knowledge for further strengthening the might of its socialist motherland.

With the start of the Great Patriotic War, the working class, the peasantry and the working intelligentsia of the Soviet Union rallied even closer around the Leninist Communist Party and became an insurmountable shield on the enemy's path. "The immortal feat of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces which won a historic victory in the Great Patriotic War," states the 1977 USSR Constitution, "became a vivid manifestation of the strength of socialism."

One must then point out that in the postwar years, the unshakable friendship of the workers and peasants has been vividly embodied in the unstinting labor of the Soviet people to rebuild the national economy and to develop the virgin and fallow

lands. Forged by the party, the Leninist union of the working class and the peasantry ensured the complete and final victory of socialism in the USSR and the building of a developed socialist society.

In completing a description of material on the first question, it must be pointed out that the grandiose and complex nature of the political and socioeconomic problems which the Soviet people must solve in the struggle to create a classless communist society bring about a greater role and significance for this alliance. The party has stated in its Program: "The CPSU proceeds from the view that a further strengthening of the unshakable union of the working class and the kolkhoz peasantry is of decisive political and socioeconomic significance for the construction of communism in the USSR" ("Programma KPSS" [CPSU Program], p 77).

## 2. The CPSU and the USSR Constitution on the Union of the Working Class, the Kolkhoz Peasantry and the People's Intelligentsia as the Social Basis of the Soviet State

In beginning to give the material on the second question it is essential to characterize the social structure of our society under the conditions of developed socialism. This is a society of mature socialist social relations in which, on a basis of the merging of all classes and social strata, on the legal and actual equality of all nations and nationalities and their fraternal cooperation, a new historical community of people, the Soviet people, has been formed. In the stage of developed socialism, as is emphasized in the current Constitution of our nation, "the union of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia, the friendship of the USSR nations and nationalities have grown stronger. A sociopolitical and ideological unity has formed in Soviet society where the leading force is the working class. Having carried out the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviet state has become a state of all the people. The leading role of the Communist Party, the vanguard of the entire people, has risen." An unshakable union of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, the Basic Law states, comprises the social basis of the USSR. It is based on a community of fundamental interests of the Soviet people in building communism and defending the revolutionary victories of socialism.

One must go on to point out that the 25th CPSU Congress paid great attention to the questions of the party's social policy at the present stage of communist construction. The congress set the task of ensuring the fuller satisfying of the growing material and spiritual needs of the people on a basis of economic growth and a rise in the efficiency of social production, the consistent development of the socialist way of life and a further improving in the social structure of Soviet society. These provisions were reaffirmed in a whole series of our party's documents, including in the decisions of the June and October (1980) plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, the Fourth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Tenth Sitting and in the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990." All these party documents reaffirm that the working class at present is in the vanguard of the builders of communism. What defines its leading role in Soviet society under today's conditions?

The working class was and remains the basic productive force of the nation. It is the most numerous class in Soviet society. At present workers comprise two-thirds of the employed population of the nation. But the working class has grown not only quantitatively but most importantly qualitatively. The predominant majority of workers are educated, knowledgeable and politically literate people. The nature of their work is growing closer to the labor of engineers and technicians.

The working class is armed with the most advanced scientific ideology, Marxism-Leninism, which has now become the ideology of all the Soviet people. It is a powerful force for scientific and technical progress and makes a decisive contribution to the creation of the national wealth of the country and its national income. The industrial and defense might of the motherland as well as the technical base for transforming agriculture and the other economic sectors have been created primarily by its hands. Soviet workers comprise 43 percent of the CPSU members. One out of every ten workers is a communist. The social activeness of the working class is continuously growing and its role is being strengthened in shaping and carrying out state policy. A specific expression of the leading role of the working class in the nation's political life is its broad representation in the soviets. Thus, workers comprise, respectively, 33.2 and 37.5 percent of the deputies of the Union and autonomous republic supreme soviets, while they are 43.3 percent in the local soviets.

Revolutionary character, discipline, organization and collectivism determine the leading place of the working class in the system of socialist social relationships. The process of forming the social homogeneity of our society is occurring with the determining role of the working class, on a basis of the growing together of all classes and social strata and fraternal cooperation between all the nations and nationalities of the USSR. "The efforts of the party," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "in the future will be aimed at the growth and strengthening of the influence of the working class in all spheres of life of our society and at making its activeness and initiative bear even greater results" ("Leninskii Kursom," Vol 3, p 276).

The leading role of the working class in a socialist society in no way detracts from the role of the peasantry and the intelligentsia. In developing itself, it creates the necessary conditions for the all-round development of the kolkhoz peasantry. In receiving great aid from the working class and from the state, the Soviet peasantry makes an ever-greater contribution to the construction of communism. Our agriculture creates more than one-third of our national income. Three-quarters of the consumer goods needed by the population come from agricultural products or products produced from agricultural raw materials.

At present, the productive forces in agriculture have reached such a level that farming has nearly merged with industry. At present, the countryside employs 2.5 million tractors, 700,000 grain-harvesting combines and other diverse equipment. And at one time V. I. Lenin dreamed of supplying our countryside with 100,000 tractors.

The total volume of agricultural product has increased over the years of Soviet power by 4.4-fold. And over the long run it will increase even more. In accord with the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee "Basic Directions in the Economic and



Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990," in the 11th Five-Year Plan the machine builders should supply the countryside with an enormous amount of equipment, including 1.87 million tractors, 1.45 million trucks and 600,000 grain-harvesting combines.

Social progress in the countryside is clearly manifested in the growth of the cultural and technical level of the kolkhoz members and sovkhos workers and in the improvement in their cultural services. An intense process is underway of bringing together the educational levels of the urban and rural population. In 1939, in the city the share of persons having a higher and secondary (complete and incomplete) education was 4-fold higher than in the countryside, but in 1979, just 1.2-fold, that is, these indicators were almost equal. In terms of the number of books and magazines per 100 persons of the population, the rural local libraries at present are the equal of the city ones. Radio, the movies and television play an ever-increasing role in the spiritual life of the countryside.

The professional structure of the kolkhoz peasantry has changed significantly. The equipment operator personnel has grown. In 1977, the nation's kolkhozes and sovkhoses had 4,222,000 equipment operators of various types, and this was 3-fold more than in 1940. "The kolkhoz peasantry," commented the 25th CPSU Congress, "in terms of its socioeconomic status has come close to the working class" ("Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 166).

The role of the people's intelligentsia grows in a developed socialist society. The number of workers engaged in mental labor has been increasing rapidly. In 1926, the nation had less than 3 million workers engaged predominantly in mental labor, and at the beginning of 1980, there were already around 39 million of them. The USSR actively employs an enormous army of scientific workers. Their number has increased from 98,300 persons in 1940 up to 1.3 million in 1978.

Particularly high has been the growth rate of the scientific and technical intelligentsia and they surpass the growth rate of the other social groups. This process is a natural one. It is the result of the party's policy aimed at the greatest possible acceleration of scientific and technical progress and at further increasing the educational level of the people.

The Soviet intelligentsia has long since become of the people in terms of its origin and socialist in terms of its nature. Its formation has occurred under the influence of scientific and technical progress, the successes of the cultural revolution and the intense growth of the educational and cultural-technical level of the masses of people.

In completing the description of material on the second question, it must be emphasized that the Communist Party plays the decisive role in the all-round strengthening of the union of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia. The party is the guiding and directing force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system and the state and social organizations. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people.

The scientifically based policy of our party precisely considers both the interests of all the people as well as the interests of all the component classes and social

groups and directs them into a common channel. The Soviet people wholeheartedly believe in their party and unanimously support its domestic and foreign policy. This is the main guarantee for our successes in communist construction and in further strengthening the union of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia as well as the sociopolitical and ideological unity of Soviet society.

### 3. The Significance of the Unshakable Union of the Working Class, the Kolkhoz Peasantry and the People's Intelligentsia for Defending the Socialist Fatherland

In beginning to give the material on the third question, it is essential to point out the particular importance of the union of the working class and peasantry for the armed defense of the socialist fatherland and for strengthening the defense capability of the nation. Here it is wise to give Lenin's view that "the Red Army is invincible because it has united millions of working peasants with the workers...." (PSS, Vol 38, p 234).

The union of the working class and the peasantry underwent severe testing during the period of the wars for the defense of the socialist fatherland and which were forced on our nation by imperialism. During the years of the Civil War and the foreign military intervention, this alliance was of a military political nature. It was based on the common interest of the working class and the working peasantry to defeat the interventionists and the White Guards who were endeavoring to restore the power of the capitalists and landowners in Russia. In explaining the goals of the struggle against the class enemy, the Communist Party raised up and organized the proletariat and the enormous masses of working peasantry to defend the revolutionary victories.

The Red Army created by the efforts of the party headed by V. I. Lenin was a new type of army. While the old army was a weapon for suppressing and holding down the exploited, the Red Army became a weapon for their liberation, an army defending the victories of the workers and peasants. It embodied the union of workers and peasants and the union of workers from different peoples. V. I. Lenin pointed out that the organization of the Red Army magnificently realized the consistency and firmness of proletarian leadership in an alliance of the workers and working peasantry against all exploiters (see PSS, Vol 42, p 139). This gave strength to our army and made it invincible in the struggle against the enemies.

V. I. Lenin saw in the military-political alliance of the workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class a source of victory for the Soviet nation in the Civil War. In speaking about the sources of this victory, he emphasized: "All that we have achieved shows that we are relying on the most miraculous force in the world, on the force of the workers and peasants" (PSS, Vol 44, p 234).

The alliance of the working class and the peasantry of the USSR honorably withstood very severe testing during the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet people fought for victory for almost 1,500 days and nights. The outcome of this struggle was determined both on the battlefields as well as in the shops of the plants and factories, on the kolkhozes and sovkhoses and in the scientific institutions and design bureaus. In the achieving of victory a crucial role was played by the rapidly

growing opportunities of the national economy to supply the front with everything necessary, by the military might of the Soviet Armed Forces, by the moral-political solidarity of the Soviet people, by their wholehearted devotion to the ideals of communism, by undying love for their socialist motherland and by mass military and labor heroism. In the struggle against the Nazi invaders, the unshakable union of the working class, the working peasantry and the people's intelligentsia was polished with new bright facets. The war again convincingly demonstrated that this is the main and decisive force of Soviet society, a dependable guarantee for its viability both in peacetime and in wartime and a source of all the victories of the Soviet people.

Our Armed Forces today are the armed forces of a state of all the people. They are not only a school of military mastery but also a good school in ideological and physical development, discipline and organization. They are a living embodiment of socialist internationalism. They are a dependable guard for the peaceful creative labor of the Soviet people and a bastion of universal peace.

The monolithic solidarity of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia, the commonness of their fundamental interests and goals represent the basis of the high moral-political potential of our nation and of the morale of the Soviet Armed Forces. The workers and peasants arm the army not only with materiel but also with ideas and moods which are transmitted to the soldiers, sergeants and officers from the people. The USSR Armed Forces reflect the socio-political and ideological unity of Soviet society and this makes our army monolithic and completely devoted to our people, to the Communist Party and to the Soviet government.

The unshakable union of the working class, the peasantry and the people's intelligentsia and the ever-developing social homogeneity of Soviet society serve as the basis for the unity of the army and the people. The Communist Party does everything to strengthen this unity. It is particularly apparent in the constant concern of the people to supply the Army and Navy with first-rate equipment and weapons and thereby raise the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, it is manifested in the preparing of the youth to defend the socialist fatherland and in the significant improvement in the material, service and cultural support for the personnel.

The Armed Forces which are an inseparable part of the Soviet people express the will and interests of the workers, the peasants and the intelligentsia, all the nations and nationalities of our country. "The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people," states the USSR Constitution, "is to securely defend the socialist fatherland and to be in a constant state of combat readiness which would guarantee the immediate rebuff of any aggressor." In the Army and Navy the young citizens of the Soviet nation are tempered politically, they become mature in ideological terms and acquire high moral and physical qualities. During their service the young men acquire new specialties and improve their former professional skills. Such persons are needed not only in the army but also represent an exceptional value for the national economy and for communist construction.

The rapid development of the productive forces in Soviet society has led to a rise in the educational level of the working class and the kolkhoz peasantry and to the growth of their technical knowledge. This has had a profound impact on the Army



and Navy. There has been a continuous rise in the general educational and technical preparation of the inductees which each year are sent to the troops units and ships. In 1940, only 35.5 percent of the youth going into the army had a higher, secondary and incomplete secondary education. In 1961, this percentage had risen up to 79, and at present almost 100 percent of the young men enter the army with such an education.

It is desirable to point out that one out of every three inductees undergoes training in the DOSAAF training organizations. Almost one-half of the officer positions in the Army and Navy are held by engineers and technicians.

At present our nation has developed a new type of serviceman, a man from the army of developed socialism. He possesses high political and moral qualities and culture, he has a good general educational and special preparation, and is a patriot and internationalist. "An improvement in the social composition of the Armed Forces and the rise in the general educational, professional and cultural levels of their personnel," emphasized the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "have told favorably on the entire process of military organizational development, they help to effectively utilize scientific and technical progress in the upgrading of our Army and Navy and provide the rapid mastery of complex military affairs by the men."

The communists are the cohesive force of the Army and Navy. They head the socialist competition and set the example in improving their ideological tempering, their combat skills, discipline and organization, in maintaining high political vigilance, observing moral purity and in overall culture. The Komsomol members represent a significant force in the Army and Navy. Together with the communists they fight for the high combat readiness of the military collectives.

At present the new training year is picking up its pace in the Army and Navy. The men of the subunits, units and ships realize well what responsible tasks they must carry out. They are endeavoring to add to what has been achieved, to further raise vigilance and combat readiness, discipline and organization and to ensure the secure defense of the great revolutionary victories of the Soviet people. The defenders of the motherland, along with all the people, with enormous attention are studying, discussing and fervently approving the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990."

In completing the giving of the material on the subject, it is essential to emphasize that the sociopolitical and ideological unity of the Soviet people represents a great victory for socialism. This is a most important factor in the intensive development of the economy and culture, for further strengthening the defense capability of the nation and for its successful advancement toward communism.

Before studying the subject, it is advisable that the propagandist study the social composition of his subunit, the educational level of the soldiers and sergeants, the inductees from the city and from the countryside, and using these facts illustrate the corresponding sections of the lecture and narration. For the exercise it is wise to make up diagrams and schemes on the social composition of the USSR population, the CPSU and the USSR Armed Forces.

It would be very beneficial for the men to meet with workers and kolkhoz members, the leaders of industrial enterprises and kolkhozes, with party and soviet workers and the pacesetters of the socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress.

In the evening it is advisable to organize for the students a view of the feature films "Lenin in 1918," "The Virgin Lands Upturned," "A Man with a Gun," "A Member of the Government," and the documentary films "From Congress to Congress" and "A Word on the Soviet State," and the film strip "The Unshakable Union of the Working Class and Peasantry--The Basis for the Might of the Soviet Armed Forces."

In the course of independent work, it is recommended that the students read excerpts from the work of V. I. Lenin "Appeal to the Red Army" (PSS, Vol 38, pp 234-235), "Letter to the Workers and Peasants on the Question of Victory over Kolchak" (PSS, Vol 39, pp 152, 155, 156); from the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS," pp 81-89); from the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990" (PRAVDA, 2 December 1980).

In the seminar or talk, it is possible to discuss such questions as: 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the necessity of the union between the working class and the peasantry for overthrowing capitalism and for the victory of the socialist revolution. 2. The role of the union of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia in a developed socialist society. 3. The working class--the leading force of communist construction. 4. What role is played by a further strengthening of the union of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia for successfully carrying out the tasks of communist construction? 5. What is the significance of the unshakable union of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia for strengthening the defense capability of the nation?

#### Literature for Propagandists

1. V. I. Lenin, "What Are the 'Friends of the People' and How Do They Fight Against the Social Democrats?" PSS, Vol 1, pp 301, 310-312.
2. V. I. Lenin, "To the Rural Poor," PSS, Vol 7, pp 177-179.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Report on the Work in the Countryside of 23 March (Eighth RKP(b) Congress of 18-23 March 1919)," PSS, Vol 38, pp 192-205.
4. V. I. Lenin, "The Economy and Politics in the Age of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," PSS, Vol 39, pp 276-282.
5. V. I. Lenin, "On Cooperation," PSS, Vol 45, pp 369-377.
6. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) SSSR" [USSR Constitution (Basic Law)], Preamble and Chapters 1-5.

L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], pp 81-89.

8. "Materials of the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee," PRAVDA, 22 October 1980.
9. "Materials of the Fourth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Tenth Sitting," PRAVDA, 23-24 October 1980.
10. "Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress 'Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990'," PRAVDA, 2 December 1980.
11. D. F. Ustinov, "60 Let na Strazhe Zavoyevaniy Velikogo Oktyabrya" [Sixty Years on Guard for the Victories of Great October], Politizdat, 1978.

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## NAVAL FORCES

### PACIFIC FLEET: PROBLEMS IN SOCIALIST COMPETITION

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 81 (signed to press 5 Jan 81) pp 68-69

[From the speech of Capt 2d Rank A. Selivanov, delegate at the party conference of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "To Be in the Vanguard of the Competition"]

[Text] Among the sailors, as among all the personnel of the Armed Forces, the socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress has assumed great scope under the motto "For High Combat Readiness and Firm Military Order!" The communists play the vanguard role in this major undertaking. They interject a spirit of party loyalty, Leninist principledness and professionalism to the competition, implacability for shortcomings and by their personal example, by the force of ideological conviction and by the inspired party word, they mobilize all the sailors to increase the effectiveness and quality of military and political training.

The deeds of communists N. Zinin, N. Khimchuk, M. Sokolov, I. Sinitsin and Yu. Gavrichenko are held in high regard. They ably train and indoctrinate subordinates and themselves serve as an example in carrying out party and service duties.

Valuable experience in organizing the competition has been acquired in the division under the command of the CPSU member, Capt-Lt N. Shilov. Here, before each stage of combat training, they explain the aims and tasks of the competition and the place and role of the communists in carrying out the obligations. On the basis of a careful assessment of the individual capabilities of the sailors, realistic goals are set in the improving of their military skills. The obligations of the communists are discussed at open party meetings to which are invited Komsomol activists and unit veterans. In discussing the obligations, the previous experience of fulfilling them is considered.

The division party bureau gives great significance to raising the role of the communists who are the flagship specialists in organizing the competition. Greater demands have been placed on them and their reports on their work are often heard at party bureau sessions. At present all the flagship specialists take an active part in organizing the competition. For example, the communist N. Tolmachev has a good knowledge of the state of special training in the subordinate services, the capabilities of each specialist and his training level. In the exercises and training drills he actively introduces the method of competitiveness. This makes it possible for him to help the commanders in most correctly directing the efforts

of the competitors at achieving new goals. And the result has also been good. Among the men there are numerous outstanding men and 80 percent are specialists 1st and 2d class. As a rule, they hold the leading places in the competitions for the title of best specialist. Having unanimously supported the patriotic initiative of the Northern Fleet submariners and the Pacific Fleet sailors, here great significance is given to the greater skills of each man, to winning new goals in combat training and to increasing the effectiveness of the competition.

The party organizations have begun to make more active use of various forms of moral incentive in the competition. They widely publicize the collectives which have been awarded the challenge Red Banners, prizes and pennants for high successes. The winners of the competition are presented mementos and certificates with their names as well as photographs of them in front of the unit's colors. There is also the practice of sending letters of thanks to the parents of the servicemen who have won high results in military and political training.

However the opportunities are far from fully utilized in achieving higher indicators in the competition and in the struggle to further raise combat readiness. There still are communists who do not show a feeling of personal responsibility for raising the effectiveness of the competition. This has a negative effect upon military and political training. Thus, in the collective where the communist G. Gornastayev serves, the party members often limit themselves to just appeals to compete, but carry out little organizational work aimed at the successful implementation of the assumed obligations. Here there have been instances of oversimplification and weaknesses in combat training and effective work is not carried out for the trouble-free operation of equipment and weapons.

There are also shortcomings in organizing the competition for individual tasks. This is not sufficiently focused on maintaining firm proper order in the units and on the ships. Such a situation must also be rectified.

The start of the new training year has shown that a majority of the communists are profoundly aware of the enormous mobilizing and indoctrinational role of the competition which helps to focus the forces on rectifying shortcomings and bringing up the lagging sections so as to accelerate an overall upsurge.

The Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990" published for nation-wide discussion has evoked high patriotic feelings among the Pacific Fleet sailors. In response to the party's concern for the Soviet man and for the Armed Forces the sailors vow to apply all their energy, strength and knowledge to further increasing vigilance and combat readiness.

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## NAVAL FORCES

### GORSHKOV ON NAVAL TASKS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 81 (signed to press 5 Jan 81) pp 26-33

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Flt Adm SU S. Gorshkov, commander-in-chief of the Navy and USSR deputy minister of defense: "The Ocean Watch of the Sailors"]

[Text] The Soviet people, having successfully completed the Tenth Five-Year Plan, are greeting the 26th CPSU Congress with new labor accomplishments.

"The party is approaching its congress in close unity with the people," commented the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, at the October (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "and is approaching this with a precise program for actions in the area of domestic and foreign policy."

The past years of the five-year plan have been full of vivid historical events and accomplishments. A significant step ahead has been taken in strengthening the economic and defense might of our nation and in improving the material and cultural standard of living of the workers. The sailors, like all the Soviet people, are proud of these achievements, of the further strengthening of developed socialism and successes in carrying out the Leninist peace-loving foreign policy. They are inspired by the remarkable prospects outlined in the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990." The country is moving steadily forward along the path outlined by the great Lenin.

All the successes in communist construction and in implementing the domestic and foreign policy are linked by the workers of our nation and by the men of the Army and Navy with the activities of the Communist Party, its Central Committee and Politburo headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.

The course of international events recently has shown that imperialism, primarily American, in disregarding the lessons of history, is endeavoring to wager on force in international relations and dictate its will to the peoples. The U.S. militaristic circles are endeavoring to return the world to the times of the "Cold War." They are accelerating the arms race, they are flagrantly intervening into the internal affairs of other countries and peoples and are creating dangerous centers of military conflicts in different regions of the world.



The United States has given and is giving particular attention to strengthening its seapower and to the intensive use of it for the sake of conducting an aggressive policy. The United States has employed its naval forces in the so-called local wars, including the war in Korea and Indochina, as well as in numerous conflicts in the Near East and in the regions of the Indian Subcontinent, Latin America, in the zone of the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and in other regions of the world.

And at present a major grouping of U.S. naval forces, including carriers, has been deployed in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. A grouping is being made up which will comprise the nucleus of the so-called "Rapid Deployment Forces." Based at Diego Garcia are transport vessels with weapons and supplies for the support of the marines.

"The region of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean is becoming a more and more dangerous center of international tension," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his speech to the Indian Parliament. "Under the far-fetched pretext of defending their 'vital interests,' the powers located many thousands of kilometers from this region have concentrated a naval armada here, they are intensely increasing the armaments, broadening the network of their military bases and are applying pressure and threats to the small countries which do not do their bidding."

All of this clearly shows that American imperialism is continuing to constantly carry out its hegemonistic claims, it employs force against regimes not to its liking, it declares any region of the world ocean to be a "zone of its vital interests," and on this basis, in violation of the rights and interests of the sovereign states not to its liking, creates military bases along the frontiers of the Soviet Union. In increasing tension and in openly brandishing weapons, the American imperialists and the Chinese leadership which has sided with them do not want to consider the fundamental interests of mankind or the cause of universal peace.

Under the conditions when the United States and its closest NATO allies have created a real threat to the peoples of the world, and above all to the USSR and the other socialist countries, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states are taking the necessary measures to ensure the security of their frontiers.

The peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the peoples in the fraternal countries, in one formation with all the armed services, is also defended by the glorious Navy which is capable of restraining any possible aggression from the ocean sectors. "Under the conditions where the NATO countries possess powerful offensive naval weapons," commented Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "we must think about the appropriate defense in this sphere as well. We have created our ocean-going navy which is capable of carrying out the tasks of such defense."

The increased capabilities of the socialist economy and the achievements in scientific and technical progress have made it possible to raise the military might of all the Armed Forces, including the Navy, to a new level. At present our nation has a strong ocean-going fleet capable of dependably defending its state interests at sea. This fleet embodies the most recent achievements in nuclear power and missile building, radio electronics and shipbuilding, as well as other achievements in military and technical progress comprising a firm basis for all the weapons systems and complexes of the submarines, surface ships and naval aviation.

The technical equipping of the fleet is high. But we are aware that its strength and might at present are made up not only of modern military equipment but chiefly of the personnel. These are the admirals and officers indoctrinated by the Communist Party and having a higher general and military education, possessing high qualities as sailors and with rich experience in ocean voyages and long cruises. These are our sea-going and land-based warrant officers ["michman" and "praporshchik"] who are the immediate assistants of the officers, as well as the petty officers and sailors. They confidently control atomic reactors, very complex radio electronic equipment, missile complexes and the entire diversity of equipment with which the ships, aircraft, shore-based missile and artillery units and naval infantry are equipped.

The path traveled by the Navy from the previous congress to the next one is a path of the indefatigable military service by the sailors, petty officers, warrant officers, officers, admirals and generals who are ardent patriots and convinced internationalists who devote all their strength, knowledge and experience to the wholehearted service of the motherland and to the exemplary carrying out of military duty. The Leninist party has indoctrinated them, the loyal sons of the Soviet people, to be such. They have inherited and carry as a sacred baton the revolutionary spirit of the fighters of October and the wholehearted valor of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War.

During the previous training year, the year of the 110th birthday of V. I. Lenin and the preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress, the indicators in the fleets were improved significantly for military and political training. The officers, warrant officers, petty officers and sergeants began to work more efficiently, to assess their work more exactly and to have a more demanding attitude toward service and combat training. This was reflected in a further rise of organization and discipline, in a strengthening of vigilance and, of course, in the successful carrying out of the set tasks. There was a rise in the number of outstanding men in military and political training, high-class specialists and masters of military affairs. The sea skills of the ship crews rose noticeably. Many of them carry the honorable title of outstanding.

During the previous training year, the initiator of the socialist competition in the Navy, the crew of the large subchaser "Petropavlovsk" carried out its obligations. In difficult cruises, the sailors from the subchaser carried out the tasks confronting them with high grades.

The submarine "60 Let Velikogo Oktyabrya" of the Northern Fleet is well known in the Navy. The personnel of this boat has carried out the course problems and combat exercises with confidence and high indicators. The crews of the ASW cruiser "Lenin-grad," the large subchaser "Marshal Timoshenko," the training vessel "Smol'nyy," the landing craft "Donetskiy Shakhter" and other military collectives honorably carried out their obligations.

The initiators of the competition among the military construction workers of the Armed Forces, the military construction workers of the Pacific Fleet, last year reported good successes to the motherland.

As always, the Navy communists and Komsomol members are in the vanguard of the struggle for the highest results in training, service and discipline. They were the

pacesetter of numerous patriotic initiatives and interesting activities. The initiatives "An Outstanding Result for Each Day of a Cruise," "Hit the Target at Maximum Range with the First Round" and "Komsomol Concern for the Training Facilities" have spread everywhere.

The organization of the socialist competition, a principled assessment of its results with extensive publicity, the exchange of experience and its effective dissemination have been a constant concern for the commanders, political bodies, staffs, party and Komsomol organizations. And this has made it possible for the personnel to move from success to success.

But the achieved indicators are not the limit to the possibilities in improving combat readiness and bettering combat training, the sound basis for carrying out new, more complex tasks and for further advancement.

The preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress and the discussion of the most important program document, the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990" have evoked in the fleets a new upsurge in the creative activities of the personnel. The pregress socialist competition has developed widely on the ships and in the units. It has become a component part of the entire process of training and indoctrination for the personnel and an important means by which the commanders, the political bodies, staffs and party organizations strengthen their influence on the developing of high communist convictions in the sailors, on improving military and special knowledge and practical skills, on indoctrinating in all the men a desire to steadfastly overcome the difficulties of navy service and to struggle constantly for the high combat readiness of the subunit, ship, unit and formation. The competition directly contributes to an improvement in the moral-military qualities of the officers, warrant officers, petty officers and sailors and to a rise in their general and military culture.

Today we can say with confidence that each day of combat training brings good results and helps to raise the combat readiness of the task forces, formations and units. The exercises for the formations of diverse forces are conducted on a higher professional level, and their coordination on an operational and tactical level is being worked out better and more effectively. A training system has been developed which proceeds from the simple to the complicated, from the working through of the tasks by individual ships and aircraft to the carrying out of these tasks as a whole.

We see the path to increasing the results of training in a development and improvement of the tactical procedures and methods of actions, in raising the professional level and special training of the personnel, in improving the organization of planning, and in steadily realizing the combat capabilities of all the equipment and weapons. It is essential to ensure constant, good preparation, teamwork and preciseness in the work of the crews and to struggle steadily for the search for and introduction of new forms of training and for improving the entire training process.

Here the main role is played by the commanders of the ships, units and formations, and they bear great responsibility to the party and the people for the weapons and military equipment assigned to them, for the fate of their subordinates, and for



the constant maintaining of combat readiness and the ability to carry out combat missions at any moment. An absolute majority of the commanders are able mentors of their subordinates, demanding and considerate chiefs who possess good organizational abilities, firmness in decisions and actions and the ability to direct the efforts of the men to the unconditional carrying out of the combat training tasks. The high responsibility of a commander has been and remains the foundation on which are based his command skills, his profound knowledge of the state of affairs on the ship, in the unit, the formation or task force and the ability to determine the main element in work and to take decisive and effective measures to increase the level of combat training.

The officer personnel, and above all the ship commanders, are not just strict and demanding superiors but are also considerate, attentive indoctrinators. In combining great exactingness with concern for improving the billeting, cultural-service and material conditions in the life and service of their subordinates, they ably bring the great ideas of communism to the crew members, they direct them at embodying these ideas in their lives and by their personal example draw their subordinates into the most difficult activities under any conditions. The authority of the officers consists primarily in the strength of their moral influence on each crew member, in the ability to organize life on a long cruise according to the regulations which distill the experience of many generations of sailors and in the capacity to attract the men and inspire them to unstinting actions and deeds.

The scientific and technical revolution has substantially altered the appearance of the fleet and its technical equipping. To a significant degree this has led to a change in the conditions for conducting modern operations as these have become characterized by great spatial scope, by a high pace and by an abrupt change in the situation on the seas and oceans. There has been a significant rise in the flows of information on the condition and actions of the enemy, its forces and the situation in which combat operations will be conducted. The necessity has arisen of considering a multiplicity of basic and ancillary factors which previously were considered either only in part or were not considered at all. The old traditional forms and methods of combat control which were employed in the recent past in a majority of instances no longer conform to the constantly rising demands on the use of the forces and do not ensure efficiency and reliability of control. The elementary calculations based on the personal experience of the commander have been replaced by new work methods taken from the arsenal of the precise sciences. The actual work of the staffs involves the use of complicated control devices which are based on various types of electronic computers.

The introduction and use of automated control systems and modern communications in no way mean the abandonment of the use of logic (qualitative analysis) and experience. At present they should be used integrally for disclosing the patterns of combat operations. The automated control systems provide only quantitative recommendations for rapidly taking the soundest decision and elaborating a corresponding plan of operations or combat, while the final decision is taken by the commander. Only a profound understanding of the dynamics of an operation or combat and the ability to anticipate the course and outcome of combat operations under different conditions provide an opportunity for the commander and the staff to work out most effectively the methods of countering the enemy.

In carrying out combat training missions, individual commanders and staffs, unfortunately, do not make full use of the modern control equipment. The rapid and effective mastery of the new technical control devices and a rise in the operational and tactical viewpoint of the commanders and staffs are the main area for bringing the organization, the methods and pace of control over the forces into conformity with the capabilities of the weapons and their carriers and the nature and dynamism of modern combat.

It is quite natural that the great qualitative changes in the technical equipping of the naval vessels and aviation and the increased demands on the operational-tactical training of command personnel and the organization of the training process for the personnel bring a number of complicated and important problems to the forefront. One of them is the moral and psychological training of the crews. At present the ships set to sea for an extended time. Moreover, the voyage, as a rule, is carried out under very difficult conditions. The personnel, including the young officers and sailors who have not yet undergone the schooling of long cruises should be thoroughly prepared for overcoming the difficulties. This is not easy work and it must be carried out on the highest level. During an ocean cruise the commander should be completely confident of each crew member and know firmly that under any conditions the men will act intelligently, decisively and steadfastly and that they can withstand any stresses.

Another important task is the further strengthening of discipline on all levels and in all areas, a rise in organization and efficiency and the unifying of the troop collectives. Under present-day conditions, when the carrying out of a mission by a ship often depends upon the actions of the single specialist, high technical preparedness, discipline, efficiency brought to the highest limit are particularly essential. And these must be worked for together, in making active use of all means of ideological indoctrination.

A further improvement in the work style of the commanders, political bodies and staffs in carrying out various questions has become completely essential. Just take such a problem as their knowledge of the actual state of affairs on the ships and in the units and the constant check on the carrying out of party and government decisions, the orders and directives of superior levels as well as their own instructions and orders. Without a knowledge of the actual degree to which the personnel have mastered the equipment and weapons, their readiness to carry out combat missions and other questions, it is impossible to perform one's duties completely. V. I. Lenin demanded that the personnel be checked and the actual carrying out of the job be checked. He saw this as the crux of all work and all political activity and was sharply critical of those who "gave commands," without being interested in execution or were unable to follow up on this. He pointed out that "if this is our common failing, then in military affairs this is outright death." V. I. Lenin taught that a check on execution should be understood not as a formal verification that something had not been done, but primarily as the working out of measures to eliminate shortcomings. Control should be concrete and effective, sincere and constructive and it should be an incentive to raise the preciseness, efficiency and directness of the work done by the command and the staffs. At the same time control instills in people a desire not to be satisfied with the achieved level and makes it possible to combat indifference and weaknesses in training.

The commanders, the officers, the political bodies and staffs are regularly on the ships and in the units, they check the state of their combat readiness, the level of training, the moral-political and combat qualities of the personnel and also settle other questions. Unfortunately, such checks sometimes have a superficial nature, they are restricted to the collecting of information and facts, they do not delve deeply into shortcomings or the factors giving rise to them and do not provide concrete help in eliminating these. It is the duty and obligation of the commanders, the officers, the political bodies, the staffs and the flagship specialists not only to constantly and thoroughly study and objectively assess the actual state of affairs on the ships and in the units, to disclose and analyze the reasons for the detected shortcomings, but also to provide practical aid in eliminating them and to achieve the precise fulfillment of all the requirements of the regulations, manuals, instructions and other documents regulating the activities of officials.

For these purposes use must be made of the entire diversity of means and methods for the ideological-political, military and moral indoctrination of the personnel. Particular attention must be given to explaining the requirements of the military oath and regulations, to raising responsibility and efficiency of each man, to fighting for the cohesiveness of the collectives and indoctrinating the personnel in a pride for their ship, unit or formation.

It is generally known that the effectiveness of combat training to a significant degree depends upon the level of ideological indoctrination carried out with the personnel. This derives from the objective pattern of the greater role played by communist awareness in carrying out the great and complex tasks. The indoctrinating of the men in a spirit of high ideological loyalty and dedication to the socialist motherland and to the cause of communism and their all-round, harmonious development are one of the major factors ensuring the constant and exemplary execution of the tasks confronting the fleet. The military councils, the commanders, the political bodies and staffs, the party organizations carry out effective indoctrinational and organizational work, subordinating this to increasing the quality of carrying out specific missions and directing the efforts of the personnel at improving the combat readiness of the ships, units and formations. Here particular attention is given to indoctrinating personal responsibility of the sailors, petty officers, warrant officers and officers for their own actions and conduct as well as for the combat readiness of the subunit, unit or ship.

The fleets are consistently and steadily carrying out the demands of the party to improve ideological and political indoctrination. At present this is being organized more concretely in accord with the demands made on combat readiness and the command and pedagogical training of the officers and the tasks of mastering the weapons and equipment. The content has been enriched, the organization of the political studies of the personnel has been enhanced, agitation-propaganda and cultural-educational work has been improved and their tie with the life of the ships and units and with the tasks of strengthening military discipline, organization and order has been reinforced. Many measures have become richer in content and more diverse in forms and methods.

The constant carrying out of the demands found in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination" has been and remains at the center of attention of the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations. There has been a marked rise in their attention



to the questions of the ideological conditioning of all categories of personnel. These questions have begun to be examined more frequently at sessions of the military councils, meetings of the party and Komsomol aktiv, training-pedagogical assemblies and service meetings. There is a greater interest in studying the urgent problems of party theory and practice while the ideological and organizational level of the basic forms of political study and party education has risen. The questions of the ideological and theoretical tempering of the command and political leadership hold one of the central places.

The reports and elections held in the party organizations have demonstrated the unity and close solidarity of the fleet commanders around the Leninist CPSU Central Committee. The meetings thoroughly analyzed the results of the work carried out by the party organizations to implement the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the demands of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of defense on raising political vigilance and combat readiness.

A distinguishing feature of the reports and elections held on the eve of the 26th Party Congress has been high professionalism, principledness and a desire of the communists to carry out the pregress obligations with excellent indicators. At the meetings numerous proposals and critical comments were made related to further increasing combat readiness, the quality of combat training, improving political indoctrination, strengthening military discipline and activating internal party life. The commanders, political bodies and the party organizations, in working constantly to realize them, see this as one of the ways for further increasing the sociopolitical activeness of the party members and the effectiveness of party work.

All the fleets and all the fleet collectives, large and small, are continuing to discuss the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress as this discloses an extensive program of communist construction for the current 5 years and outlines the ways and means for a further rise in the economy, for improving the prosperity of the Soviet people and for strengthening the defense capability of the nation. The men are confident that everything planned by the party will be carried out. The guarantee for this is the inspired labor of the Soviet people and the successes with which they are greeting the party congress.

The men of the glorious Navy are marching in step with all the people. They have a great deal to do and great and complicated tasks to carry out. The main ones are: the successful fulfillment of the military and political training plans, the improving of command training, the effective use of training facilities for the comprehensive training of the combat teams and crews and the strengthening of military discipline.

In carrying out these tasks, the sailors are increasing the intensity of combat training. The commanders, the political bodies, the staffs and the party organizations are endeavoring to make the best possible use of the allocated time for obtaining the highest results in carrying out combat training missions.

The crew of the missile submarine of the Red Banner Northern Fleet under the command of Capt 1st Rank G. Nikitin has been the initiator of the pregress competition. During the year of the 26th CPSU Congress, the men have resolved to struggle constantly to maintain high combat readiness and to reaffirm the title of outstanding crew. They have pledged that 60 percent of the personnel and all the communists

will carry out the combat training standards with a rating of excellent. All combat training missions are to be carried out with excellent and good evaluations, and the missile and torpedo firings only with excellent evaluations.

The example of the initiator has been widely picked up on by the troop collectives. The sailors are approaching the congress with high indicators in military and political training and are pleased to report to our party's forum on their firm determination to dedicate all their forces to further strengthening the security of the socialist fatherland.

It is a matter of honor for the navy personnel to make the year of the 26th CPSU Congress a year of the successful fulfillment of all tasks with high quality and on the stipulated time, a year of achieving the highest goals in the mastery of modern military equipment and all methods of naval combat.

The sailors, like all the Soviet people, are profoundly aware of their responsibility to the Communist Party and the Soviet people to defend the socialist fatherland. They are vigilantly standing their honor watch and are always in combat readiness.

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## AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, RELATED ACTIVITIES

#### Subunit Training in Carpathian MD

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Feb 81 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Bedzhanyan, Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "In an Intense Rhythm"]

[Text] A color poster catches your eye as soon as you drive into the missileman's camp. The words written on it ask the soldiers to greet the 26th CPSU Congress with new successes in combat and political training, and to alertly protect the air borders of the socialist fatherland. And, assuming combat duty or going out for a routine training session, the defenders of the motherland's skies prepare themselves for difficult hours and minutes, during which each of them must act with full exertion of effort, and with a deep understanding of a soldier's duty.

Today the subunit must perform its combat mission independently. The meticulously written scenario for the training exercise calls for repulsion of single and group targets traveling at different altitudes under the cover of radio countermeasures.

The missilemen had barely finished checking out the apparatus when the first data on the "enemy" airplanes came in. The acting launcher control officer, Major M. Belan, immediately ordered the crew to prepare for battle. He does not hurry, and even in critical situations he acts coolly. But this outward calmness only conceals maximum attention, intense thinking, and considerable experience, which permits the officer to competently execute any mission, even one that comes up unexpectedly.

The events developed swiftly. The first notations of the target's route appeared on the plotting board. And soon after, Senior Lieutenant V. Kruglov, who was working at the interception controller's panel, and operators privates A. Nazola and V. Kukishenko locked onto the target in an instant.

Both soldiers were still just learning their army specialty. This is why Major Belan, who accounted for previous mistakes in the training of the novices, foresaw



a relatively simple aerial situation at the beginning of the training exercise. This teaching tactic helped the young specialists to get into the swing of combat work smoothly.

The pitch was gradually increased. Just previously, there were only single airplanes at moderate altitudes. Now a maneuvering target appeared, and behind it an electronic countermeasures craft. Intense blips appeared on the screens. But the specialists of the crew competently tuned out the interference with their apparatus. The commands of the launcher control officer almost blended in with the reports of the interception controller and the operators. Although this was an ordinary training exercise, every simulated launching was treated as a real one. Therefore the missilemen tried to act as sharply and attentively as possible.

Then came a slight pause in the actions of the airborne "enemy". Major Belan used it for a brief critique of the work of the specialists, during which he pointed out the rough spots. And they were there. In particular, Private V. Kukishenko lacked the ability to instantaneously react to the commands of the interception controller. Senior Lieutenant Kruglov did not always monitor his actions attentively.

Having described and demonstrated how these and other shortcomings could be eliminated, the leader of the training exercise made the situation more complex, in accordance with its scenario. Senior Lieutenant Yu. Sementsov took over the interception controller's panel at the same time that Private V. Kukishenko was replaced by Junior Sergeant Kh. Mamedov.

Interchangeability in the battery is given priority attention. Some commanders reason so: The men have learned the basic habits of their associated specialties, and that's enough, the rest will come on its own, they say. But can we rely on such back-ups in a critical minute of combat? Not likely. Therefore this question is treated as being fully resolved in the subunit only after the missilemen are able to work in their associated specialties just as confidently as in their own.

And so it was that Senior Lieutenant Yu. Sementsov was now able to get some practice in his role as interception controller. He attentively watched the behavior of the target traces on his screen. Two of them, little ones, blinked near the edge of the zone of fire, and disappeared into the interference. But neither their enormous speed nor the interference caught the senior lieutenant's attention. The minimum interval between the airplanes--that was what was most important. Which of them would enter the zone of fire first? Will there be enough time to fire on the second target? The training rhythm became increasingly more intense. The load on the experienced specialists, and all the more so on the young ones, grew. But the training exercise leader had accounted for everything beforehand: They would be able to fulfill their difficult mission on the condition that they applied their full strength. This is precisely the approach required of a training exercise organizer. It is only in this case that specialists would gain a deeper understanding of the nature of modern combat, and learn to act efficiently and coolly in all situations.

Major Belan watched Sementsov, sitting next to him, from the corner of his eye. Small droplets of perspiration formed on the senior lieutenant's face. He was all tense, as if a coiled spring. A considerable amount of nervous tension could

also be sensed in the reports of the operators. Well, what else could be expected? The psychological load in these tense moments of battle is especially high. Will the controllers endure it? In the next moment, however, Major Belan's question was no longer relevant. Responding to his command, the interception controller and the operators locked onto the first target without mistakes. The command "Launch" resounded, and switches clicked on the control panels instantaneously. Once again another lock-on. The other target this time. The men proved themselves to be sharpshooters in the training exercise.

In the last training year the missilemen of this battery achieved high results in practice launching at the training ground. But it is now their rule to not march in place, to march onward in combat perfection, to shoot better. We can believe that they will honorably fulfill their pledges in the preCongress competitions.

#### Life at a Remote Site

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Feb 81 p 1

[Article by Captain 2d Rank A. Zlydnev: "Beneath Scarlet Wind-Filled Antennas"]

[Text] The helicopter was still nowhere to be seen, and Engineer-Captain Vladimir Yakovlevich Golovan' listened with unconcealed anxiety to the howling of the snowstorm. The northeast wind grew to its full force and savagely beat down on the little hill, lost in the vastness of the tundra. It was clearly intent upon snatching the little pile of structures from its summit, above which, shaking and whining from the strain, the broad wings of the powerful antenna were deployed.

The officer knew quite well that even the local helicopter aces would not take off in such weather, and he could not condemn the pilots for that. In his years of service at remote "points", he gained a deep respect for the toilers of the skies, who never refused a call for help. It was now storming seriously, and the subunit commander worried about how the green soldiers in that faraway settlement, who were to replace senior comrades who had served their time, were faring. A new subunit commander was to arrive any day now--Golovan' was being transferred back to the Big Land, as they say here. The years went by quickly. The day-to-day concerns seemed to compress time. The most varied incidents of day-to-day military service were still fresh in the engineer-captain's memory. Perhaps it would be too much to describe them all. But here are some of them.

Incident One. Engineer-Colonel Victor Yakovlevich Kuznetsov was summarizing the results of the just-finished inspection.

"The overall score is good. But it could have been better. If only," his eyes searched out Lieutenant Arkadiy Smelkov, "if only Lieutenant Smelkov's crew had not let us down. Let us analyze why this happened...."

Golovan' looked at the lieutenant, who had risen from his seat and who did not know what to do with his hands in his embarrassment, and he recalled his own numerous talks with him.

After assuming his post, Smelkov encountered the difficulties normally experienced by a novice, but he let them overwhelm him. Many things did not work out right for him. He was shy around his subordinates, and he kept away from the officers. He never had anything to say. On being relieved from duty, he would immediately race to his quarters, where he would put on earphones, turn on the tape recorder, and listen to music.

"The example an officer sets for subordinates is the main thing," Engineer-Captain Golovan' said at the end of one of several discussions with the lieutenant. "You have undergone special technical training, and still the grades are all poor."

Smelkov agreed with everyone, and he promised to improve himself, but time passed, and no changes occurred. It was only a few months later that he began to realize that he was just as important at the station as everyone else, and that he was given an important job that would not tolerate superficiality. The lieutenant began serving better. Soon after, another inspection....

"The conclusion is simple," the engineer-colonel said as he paced the room. "Lieutenant Smelkov needs stricter supervision and help."

Golovan' once again glanced briefly at Smelkov. "Yes, the lieutenant has still not stood up firmly on his own two feet," the thought flashed by. "But the time will come, and he will stand up. Definitely stand up...."

Incident Two: The diesel generator is the heart of a remote "point". Energy, light, heat and, consequently, life--everything depends on it, the heart. This machine of steel, which requires constant care, is supervised by Engineer-Captain Vasiliy Panchuk. He supervises it confidently, knowledgeably, though things did not go entirely smoothly at first. Not at Panchuk's fault. Because of the carelessness and excessive self-confidence of his predecessor. "The wheels are turning," he said joyfully as he turned his affairs over to Vasiliy, "and the soldiers are toiling, which means everything is okay." "But what about the automatic control system?" Panchuk cautiously queried. "Eh," the officer waved the question away, "it's not important, though I should let you know that it is working all right too." And with that, he flew away.

But an inspection showed that the soldiers were barely able to understand the automatic system; they were simply scared of it. And this is why, for example, the automatic control system, which was intended to monitor the parameters of the diesel generator and protect it from trouble, often failed, causing "cardiac insufficiency", so to speak, and requiring immediate intervention. And such times always created a flurry of excitement.

Panchuk went to the commander with his concerns. Several officers were with him already.

"We won't go far without the automatic control system," Panchuk began his report, spreading diagrams and mathematical formulas over the desk. "Look what happens if just this block fails to work."

Technical talk began, and immediately both Captain Pelykh and Engineer-Senior Lieutenant Tagakov joined in. The common practice at a "point" is to resolve all complex issues together.



Golovan' attentively followed Panchuk's line of reasoning and examined his calculations. The conclusion was clear: Real training in the use of the automatic control system was needed, and good specialists had to be prepared.

Panchuk competently organized the lessons with his subordinates. Together with his closest assistant, Vladimir Goldys--presently a senior sergeant in the reserves--and other soldiers he set the automatic system straight. Not long after that, it pulled the "point" out of a very bad spot.

It happened at night. A young specialist, Private Aleksandr Borisenko, was on duty. Having made his routine rounds of the diesel generator building, he curled up beside the console of the automatic control system and began preparing for his forthcoming exams for a higher class rating. It was at this moment that a warning signal turned on, indicating that there was no power at the output.

An alarm raised Panchuk, Tagakov, and the subunit commander to their feet. All rushed to the generator building. A minute later junior sergeants Boris Borovkov and Ivan Koryrenko arrived and started up the back-up generator. Just as quickly and smoothly, the required switches were operated, and power returned once again. The heart of the "point" began pumping rhythmically and powerfully again.

Incident Three: One day the tundra caught fire. The hill was a respectable distance away, but a passing wind carried the smell of fire to the hill, and dense smoke could be seen with the unaided eye. A fire in the tundra is a major calamity--it is not easy to put it out. It is feared by reindeer herders--fire destroys feed. Fearful also are the reindeer: Stampeded by flames, they may scatter all over the tundra, and then try to bring them all back together again. This is why the director of a reindeer sovkhos telephoned the "point", which was not all that close: "The tundra is on fire, Vladimir Yakovlevich, help us!" "We're on our way!" Golovan' shouted back into the receiver, and turned to Tagakov:

"Is the cross-country ready to roll? Get 10 men ready. Put Warrant Officer Berezhnoy in charge."

The firefighting crew worked 4 days. The tundra was saved.

In another time, it happened like this. A snowstorm raged from one hour to the next. A fierce gust of wind broke the stack of the boiler room like a match, and it hung their with its destiny in the hands of the guy wires.

"What will we do, Comrade Captain?" Tagakov asked, straining his voice.

"What else can we do? Put the stack back up."

"Maybe we should wait until it quiets down?" Pelykh shouted. "This wind could be dangerous."

"It's going to go any time. No, we can't wait. Get a tractor over here quickly. I'll strap it up myself."

Later, after the stack was back in place again, Golovan' confessed. "I knew that if I were as terrified as I was, I had no right to send a soldier up there..." and that's the whole story.

Then there's building to be done. Imagine how hard it is to build in such remote places! A nearby forest would have been nice, but this is tundra, where neither a fallen branch nor a spare board is to be found. But build we must. And so a tractor must be sent out dozens of kilometers, helicopter pilots have to be begged, and deals have to be made with tugboat captains.

"Despite all that, we have managed to build a few things," Golovan' smiles. "With helpers such as warrant officers Aleksandr Vlovin and Aleksandr Yarovoy, we could turn the whole hill upside-down."

Well, the hill is still in place. But at its very summit, the soldiers have erected a refrigerator (there can be no talk of spoiling meat), a bath house (bath day is a real holiday for the soldiers), and a vegetable storehouse (there are now fresh potatoes year-round) with their own hands. They are setting up an entire complex including a back-up generator and boiler room (the survivability of the "point" will rise).

"We weren't able to finish the living quarters," the political worker said. "All we have done is get the roof up. But next summer we hope to have our housewarming."

"A pity, I won't be here, Stepan Vasil'yevich," Golovan' noted. "It should be a good party."

Days and weeks have passed since my return from the "point". As I write my story at this late hour, I try to imagine life there. I see a ping pong ball bouncing about the officers' dormitory. Age-old rivals--Senior Lieutenant Valeriy Fedorov and Lieutenant Aleksandr Maslov--have come together for their favorite game. Off-duty officers and warrant officers have gathered together at the end of the corridor. They are joined by Ol'ga Nikolayevna Fedorova and her four-year-old Irinka, and year-old Andreyka Yarovoy shuffles over, abandoning his mother preparing dinner in the kitchen. And above the hill, in the rays of the northern lights, the scarlet antennas billow out in response to the chilling north wind. And as always, specialists toil at their combat posts. They toil with zeal, with inspiration. It can be no other way at a "point"!

#### Training at a Launch Battery

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Feb 81 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel N. Ostras', deputy commander, Nth Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment: "Exactingness"]

[Text] The launching battery was undergoing launcher loading exercises. The crews were competing among each other. Loading consists of numerous elements, and they all require physical exertion, but the crews maintained a good pace. Columns of time figures grew in the notebook of the battery commander, Captain A. Musiyenko.

When the training was finished, with deliberate slowness he extended the notebook toward regimental staff officer Major V. Suslov.

"The standard was met!" said Musiyenko to the inspector.

Major Suslov checked the battery commander's figures against his own. There were no discrepancies, the task had been completed successfully. Anyway, the staff officer had not expected anything else: The battery had been the best for 2 years now, and Musiyenko himself was one of the top specialists, with considerable experience in combat training launches at the practice range behind his back. But the inspector was not too hasty with his praise. He, who had been a launching battery commander himself not that long ago and who brought glory to himself with his polished skill, noticed mistakes and rough edges in the work of the specialists during the exercise, ones which went by unnoticed by Captain Musiyenko. It was to these problems that the discussion turned, a substantial one, with all of the facts and figures laid out.

In particular the inspector turned his attention to the following fact. The best scores were earned in the exercise by the crew commanded by Junior Sergeant L. Bagdasaryan, in which all specialists were young soldiers. The conclusion begged itself: Some of the experienced launcher numbers in the other crews were not working to full capacity. Obviously, they were thinking that once they achieve outstanding results, there is nowhere else to go. Thus, success became a unique sort of psychological barrier. It had to be surmounted. This was one of the reserves of professional improvement of the specialists.

And here are some other reserves. The battery did little training with a skeleton crew, and while wearing personal protective resources. Attention also had to be turned to the fact that not all crew numbers were reporting completion of operations promptly--this slows down the pace of the combat work. More night training exercises had to be planned, and they had to be saturated with elements that would help the soldiers become psychologically stronger.

The painstaking critique and the staff officer's recommendations helped the battery commander make the corrections in combat training organization, and place the revealed reserves into action.

Major Suslov reported the results of the launching battery's work to the regiment commander, Colonel V. Parshikov. Such was the rule in our unit--all staff officers had to give a personal report to the commander on returning from the subunits. The discussion centered on the shortcomings that were revealed, on what had been done to correct them, and what steps had to be taken to straighten the situation out completely and improve the skills of the subunit's soldiers. Frequently such discussion has led to operational conferences attended by the staff officers with the purpose of arriving at collective decisions on how to provide effective assistance to a subunit commander hoping to organize training and competition more effectively. Staff officers take an active part in the implementation of such decisions.

High exactingness and imposition of strict responsibility upon each individual for the state of affairs in the unit--this is the main line in the struggle to raise the effectiveness of combat training and to insure fulfillment of socialist pledges. We try to completely exclude interruptions and postponements of lessons, and other



deviations from the training program. Meticulous control over combat training helps us promptly reveal simplifications and laxity, and to take efficient steps to correct the problems.

Some time ago, launching battery commander Senior Lieutenant V. Kochetkov decided to delete a number of the elements in loading the launchers, feeling that they have no effect on the quality with which the equipment was prepared for combat. This serious mistake was pointed out to him.

In contrast to Captain Musiyenko's attitude, the officer took the remark of the regimental staff representative as an insult. This is not the first year I have been a commander, he thought, and I know what I'm doing. Moreover the battery was not at all the worst in the unit.

That subunit was in fact one of the outstanding ones in its time. Later, when the commander was promoted and he was replaced by Senior Lieutenant Kochetkov, its grades fell somewhat. One of the reasons for this was laxity in the training, and mistakes in the officer's training methods. Thus Kochetkov had to be set straight, and higher demands had to be placed upon him.

We devote considerable attention to improving the professional training of officers, their teaching proficiency, and their ability to organize training so that it would be instructive, to lead the competition, to deeply analyze the state of affairs, to reveal shortcomings, and to find effective ways to correct them. Experience has persuaded us many times that this is in many ways the basis of success. But some young officers still lack this ability. And as a result, the achievements of their subordinates are considerably more modest than should be.

As an example Engineer-Senior Lieutenant S. Petukhov was conducting lessons in technical training. Getting carried away with himself, he failed to notice that one of the soldiers was not listening to him, and one was only pretending to tune the particular blocks and units. Nevertheless, at the end of the lessons he gave a high grade to everyone for their practical work, giving no thought to the question as to whether or not the grades he gave were in keeping with the knowledge and skill level of the soldiers.

It stands to reason that officers such as Petukhov need constant assistance from experienced comrades. And they are given such assistance by the subunit commanders and by the unit staff. Rallies and instructor training and demonstration lessons, at which the officers improve their teaching habits and learn the art of analysis, are held regularly.

These forms of training are also used with other officers of the unit. As a rule, in this case the experience of the best teachers and teaching innovations recommended for introduction into practice are analyzed. As an example the officers of the regiment recently acquainted themselves with the use of so-called combat situation programs developed by Captain Ye. Chernyshov. These programs represent a model of different variants of combat with an airborne enemy, which can be created with the help of trainers and simulators. We hope that their universal introduction will produce a significant impact in improving the combat skills of the personnel, and set the stage for successful fulfillment of pregress pledges. And this is our main concern.

High exactingness in all elements of the regiment's life, and mainly in regard to the quality of combat duty and of organization of training and competition, has permitted us to achieve stable results. This inspires the confidence that the high pledges adopted in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress will be satisfied.

#### Training Accomplishments in Kiev MD

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Feb 81 p 1

[Article by Major I. Ivanov, Red Banner Kiev Military District: "Measuring Up to the Best"]

[Text] Preparing for a tactical exercise, surface-to-air missile battery commander Captain S. Pavlovskiy convened the officers and sergeants, and thoroughly discussed the state of affairs in each crew with them. They determined together what needed special attention in the remaining days. Both the commander and his subordinates knew quite well that no matter how well the collective as a whole has performed, there are always elements and individual areas which can and must be improved.

It should be noted that the battery had made a new, noticeable stride in combat perfection. As an example soldiers called up in fall were already confidently working together with experienced specialists by mid-January. The battery crews completed practically all training missions with an outstanding score in the battalion battle drill exercises that were held at that time. The battery took first place in the unit with respect to the results of the first 2 months of the winter training period.

Achievement of such high grades in the skills of the crews was made possible mainly owing to efficient organization of combat training and competition.

The battery commanded by Captain Pavlovskiy joined the struggle for primacy among the subunits of the battalion, and later the unit as well, in the summer training period of last year, when the pregress competition began. The lead was held at that time by the surface-to-air missile battery commanded by presently Senior Lieutenant V. Derkach. It was the best in the unit, and it won second place in competitions among the district's batteries twice. On the other hand the battery commanded by Captain Pavlovskiy had no successes to distinguish it when he first took charge of it.

Introducing all of the best that had been accumulated by the leading battery into practice, Pavlovskiy (he was still a senior lieutenant at that time) led the subunit to the top. And then, joining the pregress competition, the collective adopted stiffer pledges. And on the basis of the results of last year's summer training period, the battery took first place in the unit, and it emerged the victor in competition with the best batteries of the district.

Discussing the pledges adopted for the new training year--the year of the 26th CPSU Congress, the battery commander, communists, and Komsomol executives were aware that the battery commanded by Senior Lieutenant Derkach was an extremely serious rival in the competition. If it did lose the lead at the present stage, it did so by a very little bit.

In order to hasten development of soldiers called up in the fall, Captain Pavlovskiy suggested taking the battery out in the field on the first days of winter training. The unit commander supported this proposal. And, as the experience showed, the week of combat training in the field was extremely effective, especially in relation to the young soldiers. Working with the equipment, next to experienced specialists, they learned a great deal.

Captain Pavlovskiy's example was followed by Senior Lieutenant Derkach.

During weekly analysis of the competition results in the batteries, both commanders exchange information on how each particular crew achieved its concrete results. Comparison of these results and analysis of the conditions under which they were achieved allow the officers to summarize the best experience and introduce it into practice.

As an umpire for a tactical exercise conducted by the battery under Senior Lieutenant Derkach's command, the battalion commander brought in the deputy commander of the competing battery, Senior Lieutenant V. Golovenkov. In turn, Senior Lieutenant Derkach served as the umpire in the tactical exercise conducted by the battery under Captain Pavlovskiy's command. When summarizing the results of the exercises, the battalion commander considered the opinions of the umpire and their scores. But what is perhaps most important is that each of these officers was able to compare the actions of the missilemen and make the necessary conclusions.

Issuing orders for the period preparatory to the battalion tactical exercise, Captain Pavlovskiy once again turned the attention of the officers, sergeants, and all personnel to the results that had been achieved in the battle drill exercise. They were generally all right, he noted, but they were somewhat behind those of rivals in the competition in relation to the training level of a number of specialists, and even crews. Concrete steps aimed at improving the combat proficiency of the crews were planned out on the spot.

Senior Lieutenant Derkach did exactly the same sort of thing in his battery before the tactical exercise. He brought out the scores achieved by the best crews in the neighboring battery as a reference point for his subordinates. Measuring up with the leader, whether an individual soldier or a crew or a battalion, has become the rule.

The tactical exercise in which the battalion participated recently ended. It was conducted by the senior chief on unfamiliar terrain, the missions were complex, and they had to be executed with both full and skeleton crews. In this difficult examination, both batteries and the battalion as a whole earned outstanding scores. The pledges adopted in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress were satisfied.

#### Company Training in Baltic MD

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 81 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel B. Karpov, Red Banner Baltic Military District: "Outstanding for Five Years"]

[Text] The first time I visited this company was 5 years ago, on the eve of the



25th CPSU Congress. Having achieved high successes in the pregress competition, the radar operators took first place in the unit.

Recently I once again found myself at this remote station. I was happy to learn that as before, the radar operators had the lead in the competition.

But in the intervening 5 years, the people in the company had been replaced almost completely. The combat equipment had become more sophisticated. It demanded even deeper, more-comprehensive knowledge. The combat training program had been supplemented with new disciplines and subjects that could not be understood without a knowledge of the fundamentals of mathematics and physics. The tactics of the airborne enemy had become more diverse and artful, as had the tactics of dynamic antiaircraft combat correspondingly. There were now more top-class specialists in the company. How did their proficiency improve so significantly?

Captain I. Sin'kov, the present company commander, pulled out his notebook and explained:

"In 1976 about half of the privates and sergeants had an incomplete secondary education. Now there are only three. The rest of the soldiers have diplomas from VUZ's and tekhnikums, certificates of their maturity. Before the army, many had been employed, and they learned job skills. All of this helps the young soldiers to master their combat specialties more quickly. Five years ago a little more than 40 percent of the specialists had the top classes in the company. Now the figure is 78 percent."

Naturally, time has also made significant changes in the organization of combat training. The officers, warrant officers, and sergeants are now armed with a great arsenal of scientifically grounded, time-tested forms and methods of training. The training material base created in the subunit satisfies modern requirements.

As in former times, much depends on the teaching skills of the officers. When he first started out, for example, Lieutenant L. Muravlev tried to make do with only what he had learned at school, he did little to improve himself, and this immediately had an effect on the skills of his subordinates.

The company commander had to work hard to get Muravlev to change his attitude toward the work. But it was worth it, because in a little while, the officer not only made up for lost ground but also became one of the best teachers in the subunit. The platoon under his command took the lead. And when Muravlev, now a senior lieutenant, left for a higher position in a new place of service, he warmly thanked the company commander for what he had learned.

And Sin'kov, in turn, warmly recalled his recent subordinate in a technical exercise that was held soon after. The company's position was where the battle was hottest. "Enemy" airplanes made a massed raid at different elevations. Intense jamming hindered target detection and search. Moreover the "enemy" dropped an assault landing team. Each soldier in the company found himself with a double or triple load. But this did not hinder them from completing their mission successfully. And the best actions were those of the platoon that had formerly been under Senior Lieutenant Muravlev's command.

Following the exercise the company commander climbed the hill at the center of the position and stood in the wind, breathing in the sea air. He was approached by deputy company for political affairs Lieutenant L. Patronis and party organization secretary Warrant Officer G. Tereshko. There were smiles on their tired faces.

"I think the company is going to get the top grade," said Warrant Officer Tereshko. "The people acted beyond all expectations."

"Don't be too hasty in your fortune-telling," Captain Sin'kov replied. "The last word belongs to the senior chief."

Sometime later "the last word" was proclaimed: Gratefulness was announced to all the personnel of the company. Such was the evaluation the senior chief gave to the proficiency of the radar operators.

Imagine how many such tests they have undergone in the past 5 years! And the fact that the company has been deemed best in the military district on the basis of the results of the competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress says a great deal. The main thing that the company commander and party organizations were able to do was awaken the initiative and creativity of the people, and inspire them to seek and utilize reserves.

Junior Sergeant G. Stefanovich outstripped everyone else in the number of airborne targets detected and correctly tracked. A flash leaflet was published in honor of the best operator.

Stefanovich turned to his fellow servicemen and the experienced soldiers with an appeal--to compete under the slogan "Show the young soldiers everything I know and do". His initiative was supported, and it is now being implemented. Stefanovich himself readily shares his knowledge and habits with the young soldiers. Once, watching Stefanovich, the company commander recalled the words of his father: "It is easier in battle when you are with reliable friends!" Sin'kov's father fought the fascists, he possesses an award, and he has more than a verbal acquaintance with the value of frontline friendship.

The company achieved new successes in the competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress. But the reserves of combat perfection have not been fully exhausted. Recently the crew of the radar station commanded by Captain P. Mishenko turned to the company soldiers with the following appeal: Responding to the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress with action, perform all combat training tasks only with top grades. This initiative enjoyed our avid support. The radar operators are fighting hard for high quality in their lessons, training sessions, and exercises. The company is finishing off the winter training period with high grades.

#### Assignment Problem Aired

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel B. Karpov: "Indifference"]

[Text] "Dear Editor!

"My father, Pavel Semenovich Dorogan', was at the front from 1943 on. After the war he served in the National Air Defense Forces until his retirement. He transmitted his love for the army and for the profession of the air defense officer to me and my brother, and so we followed in his footsteps.

"I served as a private in the troops of the Order of Lenin Moscow Antiaircraft District. Then I entered the Leningrad Higher Military-Political School of the Air Defense Forces. I graduated from it. I recall my father saying to me and my brother at that time: 'We, the Dorogan's, have been in the National Air Defense Forces for half a century now. And some day, you'll be celebrating your centennial.' It was with a joyous mood that I traveled to my place of service.

"But then they told me in the personnel department:

"'Where can we put you? Will you take artillery?'

"And so they sent me to an artillery battery as the deputy commander for political affairs.

"'And why did they send you to us?' they now asked at unit headquarters. 'You're not a gunner, after all.'

"Well, such is the service. I took a private apartment for me and my wife, who was in that way at the time. And 2 weeks later it was announced to me that a graduate from a military-political school, an artillery school, had arrived. Thus I had to return to the city from which I had just come. It was not until the third day that they finally got around to me there.

"'We will submit your recommendation as a Komsomol committee secretary....'

"All of these years, I have tried to conscientiously fulfill my responsibilities, but I still want to become a battery deputy commander for political affairs. I have appealed many times to officers N. Luyev, V. Yesel'son, and other officials. They promised to consider the matter, but nothing has ever changed.

"In 1980 I was ordered to participate in the harvest on short notice. The soldier drivers toiled conscientiously. And I wanted to tell this to the Komsomol members of our subunit on my return. But on the very first day I learned that I had been appointed to a new position back in August.

"This hurts me. Why are they putting me, a graduate of an air defense school, in jobs outside my qualifications?



"I still dream of traveling the road of my father and older brother."

Senior Lieutenant Ye. Dorogan'

To make matters worse, a battery deputy commander for political affairs slot was vacant in the air defense unit! Just a few days after Senior Lieutenant Dorogan' returned from the harvest, another senior lieutenant was appointed to it--from a motorized rifle regiment. And Dorogan' was transferred to that same motorized rifle regiment. I asked an officer in the personnel department to explain this paradoxical situation.

"Senior Lieutenant Dorogan' has not yet acquired the professional habits he needs to be a political worker in an air defense subunit," Major N. Politiko replied. "My basis for this is the opinion of officers Sobolev and Khrushchev."

But Colonel V. Sobolev said something that was apparently far different from what the personnel officer expected:

"Dorogan' did have certain deficiencies. But he worked well in general. And in terms of his professional qualities he is fully prepared to perform the responsibilities of a battery deputy commander for political affairs."

Lieutenant Colonel V. Khrushchev, who had also been at the harvest, had a somewhat different point of view:

"When we were preparing for departure, Dorogan' refused to perform his indoctrination responsibility with the military drivers."

"Excuse me, but he had not been assigned to your group until just 3 days before its departure, and one of these days he was the field camp duty officer!"

"Is that so?" the political worker said in amazement.

Thus I had to inform him that Senior Lieutenant Dorogan' had been unable to attend the briefings and meetings. He did not even have time to place his documents in order. Including those with which his wife could receive here money allowance during her husband's temporary duty assignment. Thus for several months she had to count on the help of relatives.

"By the way, there is evidence that Dorogan' had consumed alcoholic beverages twice," said Comrade Khrushchev.

Dorogan' himself, when I reported this to him, was dumbstruck with astonishment, explaining that he had only met Lieutenant Colonel Khrushchev once. Colonel Sobolev, to whom the young officer was directly subordinated, was even more amazed:

"I have never seen him do such a thing."

Dorogan' possesses awards from the Komsomol Central Committee. Gratefulness has been extended many times to him for his good work in exercises and firing practices. His party and service reports are favorable.

The evaluation given by Comrade Khrushchev to the work of the junior officer was explained quite simply. Just before I arrived at the unit, he and the worker in the personnel department had a telephone conversation in which they worked out how they would cover up the incident.

But is there really any way to explain or to somehow justify, red tape, and indifference toward the fate of a young officer?

"Yes, we have cleared the whole matter up," said Officer N. Luyev prior to my departure from the unit. "In the very near future we will submit a petition to higher authorities to satisfy Senior Lieutenant Dorogan's request."

It's about time.

### Maintaining Discipline

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Kalachinskiy, commander, Nth Radio Engineering Unit: "The Value of Rewards"]

[Text] The time when steps were first taken to write off, so to speak, Warrant Officer L. Voznyy as being incorrigible is still fresh in the unit's memory. I must confess that even I thought several times: "What are we going to do with him? It was a rare week that ended without reports of his misdeeds, without investigations, and without punishment.

Once a number of jobs had to be completed in the motor pool. Voznyy was given the assignment.

"Bring in at least four or five dump trucks' worth of gravel," I explained the task to the warrant officer.

I returned to the motor pool in the evening, and I was unable to recognize the parking area: It was completely covered by a thick layer of gravel. This must have taken more than four or five truck loads, I thought. I was then told that Voznyy had made a much larger number of trips.

At the official conference with which this work day ended, I singled out Voznyy as an example to the officers and warrant officers, and I declared my gratefulness to him. You should have seen how his face shined for joy. This was the same Voznyy who, it had seemed, responded to his punishments with total indifference.

Then followed another assignment. I watched to see how he would fulfill it. Voznyy did everything diligently. Although this time I deliberately refrained from rewarding him, I did offer him praise.

The warrant officer underwent a transformation before my eyes. While in former times he avoided his supervisors in the fear of getting "extra" work, now he approached them himself, asking them, and suggesting what he felt would be the best way to perform a particular task.

Of course it would be wrong to say that the gratefulness I declared to him for his work in the motor pool was the only reason for all of this. But one thing is clear: In combination with other indoctrinary measures that followed my encouragement, the latter compelled the warrant officer to look at himself with new eyes, to evaluate his shortcomings more strictly, and to find the correct line of behavior.

The Communist Party attaches tremendous significance to the educational role of the Soviet Armed Forces. The military labor of Soviet soldiers--the dependable watchmen of the Soviet people's peaceful, creative labor--received a high assessment from the 26th CPSU Congress. We know that within the large and diverse arsenal of the forms and resources of indoctrinating the soldiers and shaping their high moral-political and fighting qualities, incentives competently employed by commanders and supervisors play an important role.

It is the official duty of a unit commander to point out shortcomings in his subordinates, and demand their correction. But even in these cases we must not ignore the good things about people; we must make note of them and, when necessary, we should reward them.

Once a commission representing the higher staff was checking the unit's equipment, and it subjected us to serious criticism, quite validly. When it was all over, I received orders to analyze everything, to prepare my own orders, to punish the guilty, and to correct the shortcomings.

We did a great deal of work to fulfill these orders. First of all, as was prescribed, we analyzed everything. In addition to the existing shortcomings, we also revealed many positive things for which the men needed to be thanked. What was to be the nature of the order I was to write? Of course, were I to note only the negative things, and call for nothing but punishment in it, this one-sidedness would hardly be justified. And although it seemed at this time that rewards were out of place, we began namely with them. We gave valuable gifts to the best specialists--Captain B. Kalmykov and Warrant Officer V. Sinel'shchikov. Concurrently, having analyzed the causes of the shortcomings, we subjected the negligent to strict reprimands.

I will not begin to suggest that this was some sort of bold step on our part, but I must say that I did take it with some trepidation. Now, however, I feel a sense of satisfaction from it. Objectivity in grading both the successes and the shortcomings was received favorably in the subunit. The people place a high value on diligence and initiative noted by a senior supervisor, and they respond generously with their labor.

Some commanders, especially young ones who are insufficiently experienced, exhibit a desire to use rewards in their work with people as rarely as possible. Why? Because they would be valued more highly by their subordinates, they say. This opinion is wrong.

Once during a meeting of junior officers I asked how often they give rewards for excellence in the work of privates and sergeants. Very seldom, it turned out. And when I rebuked them for this, one of the lieutenants explained:

"Imagine, as an example, a private who has distinguished himself. And so I think: I'll extend my gratefulness to him at the end of the day. But just 1 hour later he raises such a fuss, as if someone had given him an extra detail."



"Well then, why don't you express your gratefulness right away, without waiting until evening? Then you will see whether or not he raises a fuss."

"In the final analysis, a soldier serves not for gratitude", goes the motto. I have heard it many times. And I hear it mainly from those who would not bring themselves down to express their gratefulness to a subordinate for diligence displayed in his work. I know from experience that no person is ever indifferent to praise, to deserved praise that was earned through hard work.

A year ago Senior Lieutenant Ye. Taranenko joined us as the company deputy commander for political affairs. In the very first half year in the unit, five entries were made in Taranenko's service record, in the "Rewards" section. Now their number has grown. During this time, we were able to study Taranenko well, and we now know that even if we did not express gratitude to him for excellence in his work, he would not let his work suffer. Nevertheless....

One Saturday a group of officers made a surprise visit from formation headquarters to check out the organization of our housekeeping day. The company that was in Senior Lieutenant Taranenko's charge at the moment was subjected to especially meticulous inspection. And not one serious shortcoming was noted.

In the evening, after the commander expressed his gratitude to him, Taranenko came into my office to check on a few things. We got to talking. Taranenko said:

"It is a good thing when somebody takes note right away of a job well done. Other times it is disappointing: You work hard to do a job well, and no one drops even a single good word your way. It is only later, at the end of the training year, that you find your name on the unit's master rewards list."

It was clear what the officer had in mind. Before he joined us, we had heard of Taranenko from his commanders as a capable, resourceful political worker. I cannot conceal the fact that we were amazed when we checked out his service record. He had been given only three rewards in 2 years. Did the demands really have to be so high?

I am saying this not because I want to reproach Taranenko's former commanders. Nor am I saying this because I believe in excessive generosity. When undeserved, rewards may even do greater harm than would inattention to any diligence displayed: That which is achieved without work is never given a high value.

I recall an incident involving Captain P. Ivashchenko. It was a rare rewards order that did not mention his name. Petr Nikolayevich was always among the honored guests at rallies and conferences of outstanding soldiers. At first, this was all a deserved reward. But the valuable gifts and the gratitude made his head spin, and beginning to believe himself to be an exception, Ivashchenko, who previously did in fact work with full effort, began to relate to his responsibilities with indifference. Unfortunately we noticed a little too late that combat training was getting worse in the company. Discipline also suffered, and incidentally, Ivashchenko was himself not always much of an example. With time, all of this came out in the open.

Today, analyzing the incident, one realizes that the rewards which Ivashchenko received were devalued mainly in his own eyes. First because they were offered too

generously. Second because he kept on receiving them even after the company began to lose its lead. The latter was especially destructive: Receiving rewards that were in fact undeserved, Ivashchenko began thinking that the situation that had evolved in the company was in fact deserving of such an assessment. And, being satisfied, he did little to improve training and indoctrination, and he relaxed his demands upon himself and his subordinates.

Today, this company is once again on an upward trend, though of course it has not yet reached the top. But it need not have fallen, had we made more effective use of the force of encouragement in our educational work with Captain Ivashchenko.

This is a delicate thing--to determine who precisely should be singled out. Sometimes it is important to reward an individual at the first signs of success achieved at the price of hard work. This would inspire the serviceman, and give him new strength.

For a long time the company commanded by Captain A. Lysenko could not rise above the worst. Later on, however, it began to pick up speed, and although it was still far from our best subunits, we rewarded Lysenko equally with the best commanders. Moreover the order laid special emphasis on the professional growth that had been exhibited by both himself and his subordinates. This attention to the officer played a great role in his further development. With time, he was able to bring the company up to the level of the best in the unit.

To keep the value of rewards where it should be, it is also important to understand the reasons for which they are given. Once, analyzing the disciplinary practices of the officers, we had to subject Senior Lieutenant A. Korolev to serious criticism for offering rewards for combat training and service much less frequently than for digging a hole or laying a brick. What can I say? The diligence of people in housekeeping jobs should also be noted, but of course, they are not the main reason why we are in the army. When a supervisor rewards a serviceman for excellence in the principal areas of his official activities, he orients him toward solution of key problems.

Before singling out the success of a serviceman, we need to think about the forms that reward is to take. I believe the latter to be especially significant. One can occasionally hear that the best reward for an officer or a warrant officer is a valuable gift, and for a private or extended-service sergeant it is a short leave. This opinion is even occasionally supported with what are termed facts. Just sort through some orders, and you will see that those who distinguish themselves the most, receive valuable gifts and short leaves. These are in fact substantial rewards. But are they really valuable to those who are rewarded? I am referring not to their material value, but to their moral value.

Once we decided to analyze this issue more deeply. We asked the privates and sergeants: "Which reward do you value highest of all?" Most of them expressed their preference for a letter of gratitude sent to their home town.

No one is closer or more precious to a soldier than his mother and father, and joy shared with them is joy doubled. And a letter from the commander to the soldier's home town is precisely the sort of reward where gratitude is extended not only and

not so much to the soldier, as to his relatives. And can any son not wish such a gift upon people closest to himself?!

Competent use of all forms of rewards foreseen by the regulations permits commanders and political workers to shape high moral-political, fighting, and psychological qualities in subordinates, to indoctrinate them in the spirit of faithfulness to their military duty, and to mobilize them for successful fulfillment of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### SOVIET VIEWS ON PEACE, SECURITY, COOPERATION

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 81 (signed to press 5 Jan 81) pp 8-16

[Article by S. Borisov: "By a Policy of Peace, Security and Cooperation"]

[Text] In preparing for the forthcoming 26th CPSU Congress, the communists and all the Soviet people are summing up the results of the work done since the 25th Congress of the Leninist party and in an active and involved manner are discussing the Draft of the CPSU Central Committee "Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Up to 1990." It is natural here to analyze, weigh and assess both the state of affairs within the nation as well as the effectiveness of Soviet foreign policy.

The CPSU, the Soviet state and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally have given unflagging attention to foreign policy questions and to the cardinal problems of international life. Convincing confirmation of this is the review of the question of the international situation and foreign policy of the Soviet Union held at the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum completely and fully approved the activities of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, aimed at implementing the Leninist foreign policy course of the 24th and 25th party congresses and which has become a powerful factor for the social renewal of the planet and all world development. The decree approved by the plenum reaffirmed the loyalty of the CPSU to a policy of the greatest possible strengthening of the fraternal alliance of the socialist states, the supporting of the just struggle of peoples for freedom and independence, for peaceful coexistence, for checking the arms race, for the maintaining and development of international detente and for mutually advantageous cooperation among states belonging to the different social systems. The plenum instructed the Politburo to unswervingly continue this course in the future.

Under present-day conditions, when the contradiction between socialism and capitalism continues to remain the basic, main contradiction of the age and the struggle and rivalry of the two systems is the core of all international life, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is a powerful weapon of the party in ensuring the most favorable international conditions for the construction of communism in our nation and for an active influence on the entire course of world development.

Soviet foreign policy has been unwaveringly directed at the consolidating of peace between peoples and establishing principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different sociopolitical systems. Peace and socialism are inseparably linked concepts. The founder of our state, V. I. Lenin, oriented the Soviet nation at consistently carrying out a peaceful policy in the interests of defending the victorious revolution and the common cause of the workers of all countries. Lenin scientifically established the inevitability of peaceful coexistence, or, as he said, "peaceful cohabitation" between states with different social systems over an entire historical age. Here it is important to emphasize that peaceful coexistence does not obviate the laws of class struggle either on national or international scales and does not mean a social status quo. Peaceful coexistence and a lessening of international tension have nothing in common with the preservation of antipopular regimes, neocolonialism or the export of counterrevolution.

All aspects of Soviet foreign policy are permeated by Leninist ideas of proletarian internationalism. In practical terms this means that whatever actions the USSR may undertake on the international scene, it would never forget the fundamental interests of world socialism, the international communist, workers and national liberation movements and world social progress.

The foreign policy course of the USSR is an organic component in the strategy and tactics of the CPSU. "The Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet state," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "is socialist in content, consistently internationalist, truly democratic and profoundly peace-loving; it represents one of the important sources in the strength and world-wide authority of our socialist motherland and world socialism." Constant leadership by the CPSU is the most important pledge and dependable guarantee for the successes of Soviet foreign policy, its effectiveness and enormous transforming and creative force.

The decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress have made an inestimable contribution to the further creative development of the Marxist-Leninist scientific bases of Soviet foreign policy. These decisions defined a broad, comprehensive program for the struggle of the party and the Soviet state for peace, democracy and progress. This program became an organic continuation and development of the Peace Program advanced by our party's 24th Congress.

The years which have passed since the 25th Congress have been full of exceptionally intensive and fruitful activities by the CPSU and the Soviet state on the foreign policy front. The ratification of the new USSR Constitution has become an outstanding contribution of the USSR to the strengthening of the peace and security of peoples. The reinforcing of the Leninist peace-loving course as a legislative standard in a special chapter of the USSR Basic Law devoted to foreign policy serves as vivid and convincing proof that the highest principle in the activities of the Soviet state in this area is peace.

With the formation of the world system of socialist states, relations with them have held a special place in Soviet foreign policy. In giving the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out: "I think there has not been a Politburo session where we did not examine various questions related to strengthening the unity and developing cooperation with the fraternal countries and the consolidation of our common international positions."

The deepening of the all-round ties between the socialist states and the search for new forms of cooperation are a characteristic trait in the present stage of world socialism's development. For strengthening the unity of the socialist countries, of decisive significance is well organized cooperation among the Marxist-Leninist parties. "The basic principle of our close cooperation and its vital soul and directing, organizing force," the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress points out, "is of course the unshakable combat alliance of the communist parties of the socialist countries, the unity of their ideology, the unity of goals, the unity of will." Precisely the cooperation of the Marxist-Leninist parties makes it possible to activate the entire diversified mechanism of multilateral ties between the fraternal countries and peoples and defines the content of these ties.

Of particular significance for the development of international cooperation among the socialist countries are the already traditional Crimean meetings between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, and the general and first secretaries of the fraternal party central committees. At the Crimean meetings, the state and prospects for the development of bilateral relations between the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries are thoroughly discussed, and steps are outlined related to a further widening of equal, mutually advantageous economic cooperation among the socialist states.

The Warsaw Pact holds an exceptionally important place in the strengthening of the unity and solidarity of the European socialist states. Over the quarter of a century of its existence, the Warsaw Pact has proven to be a military-political alliance of a new type, the main aim of which is to prevent imperialist aggression, to guarantee the security of the peoples of the socialist countries and maintain peace on the European Continent and throughout the world.

The USSR gives primary significance to participation in the Warsaw Pact which has been and remains the center from which constantly originate initiatives which help to strengthen the peace and security of the peoples of Europe and other regions and to prevent the arms race. The Warsaw Pact members have moved from the coordinating of individual actions on the international scene to the joint elaboration and implementation of a unified foreign policy strategy.

The constant and consistent struggle for peace by the Warsaw Pact states and all the fraternal socialist countries has made it possible in the 1970's to significantly strengthen the international positions of world socialism, it made a beginning at detente and has contributed to the establishing of broad and mutually advantageous cooperation among states with different social systems.

The CPSU and the Soviet state have given unflagging attention to the development of economic ties between the socialist states both on a bilateral basis and on a multilateral one within CEMA. Along with the other CEMA countries, the USSR is undertaking measures aimed at improving the socialist international division of labor, at deepening production specialization and cooperation, and at increasing the role of CEMA as a powerful lever for progress in each member nation and in the socialist community as a whole.



The 25th CPSU Congress has stated that the dominant trend in the development of the world socialist system is a strengthening of unity among the states comprising it. Life has affirmed the profound scientific soundness of this conclusion. "The further deepening of cooperation among the socialist countries in the political, economic, defense and other areas and the constructive activities of their joint organizations, the Warsaw Pact and CEMA," the Decree of the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee points out, "dependably serve the cause of peace and progress."

The support for the national liberation movements, the establishing of all-round cooperation and the strengthening of friendship with the developing countries are a very active area for the foreign policy activities of the CPSU and the Soviet state. The Soviet Union maintains contacts with a majority of the Asian, African and Latin American states. Our country has developed close friendly ties with many of them. The treaties of friendship and cooperation undoubtedly serve as particularly important points in the development of Soviet relations with the young national states. This was reconfirmed in the course of the recent visit by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to India. The friendly relations between the Soviet and Indian peoples have become an important factor for the strengthening of peace in Asia and beyond. In developing on a sound basis of the Soviet-Indian Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, they serve as an embodiment of the principle of peaceful coexistence and equal and beneficial cooperation between states with different socioeconomic systems.

"The good relations between the USSR and India," states Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the course of the visit, "the coinciding or closeness of their positions on the basic problems of the modern world and their support for the cause of the independence of peoples, the cause of peace and equal cooperation among states and to the struggle for disarmament and the prevention of a new world war are particularly important under the conditions of the present exacerbation of the international situation."

Along with the peoples of the socialist nations, the Afro-Asian and Latin American peoples comprise a powerful detachment of fighters for peace and social progress.

The aggressive circles of imperialism together with their Beijing supporters, are endeavoring in every possible way to slander and falsify the policy of the USSR vis-a-vis the developing countries. This is particularly apparent in relation to the events in Afghanistan. As is known, fundamental democratic changes have occurred in Afghanistan and these have caused fury in the camp of world reaction. For the purpose of assisting in the defense of Afghan sovereignty, for helping the Afghan people in repelling armed incursions from outside as well as to prevent the development of an immediate threat to the security of our nation along its southern frontier, the Soviet Union, in response to a repeated appeal from the Afghan government and in full accord with the 1978 Soviet-Afghan Treaty and the UN Charter came to the aid of the Afghan people.

In the course of the visit to the USSR in October 1980, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of Afghanistan, B. Karmal, was told by L. I. Brezhnev with all certainty that: "We will firmly defend the interests of the security of both our states and we will carry out our international

duty to the Afghan people...." The Soviet government has repeatedly emphasized that the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was a purely defensive action with the sole aim of defending our friends and thwarting the imperialist plans to create a threat to the USSR from the south. The attempts by imperialist and Beijing propaganda to ascribe to the USSR any "expansionistic aims" in Afghanistan, like in any other region of the world, are a flagrant and intentional lie. The Soviet Union, with the agreement of the Afghan government, has already pulled out certain units from the Soviet troop contingent in Afghanistan.

The USSR supports the statement of the Afghan government of 14 May 1980 which contains a clear program for a political settlement to ensure the full and guaranteed halting of aggressive actions against Afghanistan and any other forms of outside interference into its internal affairs, for eliminating the tension which has arisen in this area and settling differences by talks.

Loyal to the Leninist principles of support for peoples fighting for national liberation and social progress, the Soviet Union proceeds from the view that the complete elimination of all remnants of the system of colonial suppression, of encroachments on the rights and independence of peoples and the eradication of all centers of colonialism and racism are one of the most important international tasks. The moral and material support of the USSR has played an essential role in the acquiring of independence by the peoples of a number of nations in recent years. At present the question of Namibia has become the main problem of decolonization in the south of Africa. Our nation supports the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence on the basis of preserving unity and territorial integrity. It is in favor of the immediate and complete withdrawal of South African troops and administration from Namibia and for turning over all power to the sole legitimate and authentic representative of the Namibian people, the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO).

In endeavoring to eliminate centers of conflict and prevent new crisis situations, the Soviet Union has been consistently in favor of an all-encompassing and just settlement in the Near East with the participation of all the concerned parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Arab Palestinian people. Such a settlement should envisage the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, including the eastern part of Jerusalem, the realization of the inalienable national rights of the Arab Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination and the creation of their own independent state, and the ensuring of peaceful co-existence and security for all the states of this region which are involved in the conflict.

The Near East problem can be settled only under the condition of abandoning the policy of separate deals and a return to the principle of collective efforts by all concerned parties. The Camp David policy has finally showed its hopelessness and its anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian focus. The direct consequence of the Camp David Accord was a further intensification of aggressiveness in Tel Aviv vis-a-vis the Arab countries and peoples, and above all Lebanon and the Palestinian refugees on Lebanese territory, the accelerating of measures by Israel aimed at integrating the occupied Arab territories and the systematic violation of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Regardless of the pressure and blackmail, the initiators of the Camp David Accord have not succeeded in involving a single Arab state in

separate talks. The three-way talks by the United States, Israel and Egypt on the "administrative autonomy" for the Palestinians in fact failed.

The forces of imperialism are using all means to exacerbate the situation in the region of the Near East. A convincing example of this is the dangerous machinations over the Iraqi-Iranian military conflict. This conflict is not to the benefit of either the Iraqi or the Iranian peoples. On the contrary, the imperialists are endeavoring to use each of the belligerents for their own selfish purposes, in trying to restore their lost influence in Iran. The USSR, as has been repeatedly announced by the Soviet leaders, does not intend to intervene in this conflict. But those persons who are fond of calling various regions of the world a sphere of their "vital interests" should also maintain a greater distance from the occurring events. The Iraqi-Iranian conflict can be resolved only by political means. The new important proposals advanced by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his speeches in India on the ways to ensure peace and security in the region of the Persian Gulf based on an agreement between the countries of this region, the Soviet Union, the United States, the other Western powers, China, Japan and all states which are interested in this were met with interest and approval by the peoples of many countries. These Soviet proposals point to a reasonable, just and realistic way to ensuring a lasting peace in one of the most explosive regions of our world.

The intrigues of American imperialism and the Beijing hegemonists against the socialist states of Indochina have not abated, and dangerous plans are being hatched for a clash between Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea and the other Southeast Asian countries, and to spread hostility and mutual mistrust in the region. Washington is intensely seeking out new military bases and support points in Asia and other regions of the world and is endeavoring to put together military blocs and alliances which would replace the collapsed SEATO and CENTO.

The Soviet Union, as a nation which has a significant portion of its territory in Asia, has worked constantly so that the process of the lessening of international tension would also be extended to this continent. The USSR has welcomed the idea put forward by a number of Asian states to create a strong security system in Asia. During the visit of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to India, there was again complete confirmation of the Leninist foreign policy of friendship and cooperation with the peoples of the East, for the policy of supporting their efforts in the struggle against imperialism, neocolonialism and racism, and for national independence and liberty.

In recent years, the Soviet Union as a whole has developed favorable relationships with virtually all the major Western states. Up to the middle of the 1970's, there has been a substantial turn for the better in Soviet-American relations as well. The Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Congress emphasized that Soviet-American relations had good prospects to the degree that they would develop in the future on a "jointly created, realistic basis, when with the obvious difference in the class nature of both states and their ideology, there was a firm intention to resolve differences and disputes not by force, not by threats and by the brandishing of arms, but rather by peaceful political means."

The positive development of Soviet-American relations has been complicated, however, by a number of unfavorable factors which appeared even as early as the election campaign in the United States in 1976.



In their public statements, J. Carter and the persons from his entourage came out in favor of peace, of "humanizing international relations," broadening cooperation between the USSR and the United States and the necessity of "reducing the dependence on nuclear weapons." But in actual deeds Washington behaved completely differently. Instead of the promised cut-back in military expenditures, the Carter Administration increased them by 10 billion dollars, it approved new plans for increasing military might and a decision to deploy modern types of strategic weapons and began to argue for a strengthening of NATO military might. The propaganda campaign over the so-called question of "human rights" in the socialist countries was elevated to the rank of state policy, and attempts were strengthened to intervene into Soviet internal affairs. The U.S. government undertook actions which restricted contacts between the two countries.

The changes in American foreign policy were primarily a class response to the strengthening of socialist positions, to the successes of the national liberation struggle of peoples and to the growth of democratic, progressive movements in the capitalist world. This was a sort of desperate attempt to shift the course of events to their favor and a desire by the threat of force to halt or at least hold up the process of historic changes. Also of important significance are the attempts to divert the attention of Americans from the acute internal social and political problems by artificially blowing up foreign policy questions.

Confronted by the changes in U.S. foreign policy, the Soviet government showed due restraint and did not give in to the provocative challenge. One of the major victories of our foreign policy was the completion of the elaboration of a new Soviet-American agreement on strategic arms limitations. In June 1979, a Soviet-American summit meeting was held in Vienna and in the course of this the SALT-2 Treaty was signed.

However, subsequently the international situation became noticeably more complex. This occurred because the leaders of the NATO military bloc, and above all the United States set out on a policy of disrupting the military equilibrium which had been established in the world in their favor. The U.S. ruling circles set out on a path of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, they rejected assumed obligations and violated previously signed accords and agreements. Anti-Sovietism and anticommunism in the West were turned into an instrument for intensifying the arms race, into a weapon for combating not only the USSR but also all opponents of war and peace-loving forces, into a means for undermining detente.

The rapprochement between the aggressive circles of imperialism and the Chinese hegemonists has occurred on an anti-Soviet basis which is hostile to the cause of peace. This partnership is a new phenomenon in world politics and is dangerous for all mankind, including for the American and Chinese peoples.

Imperialist propaganda has steadily fed world opinion the notion that the events in Afghanistan were supposedly the source for the deterioration of the international situation. However, long before them, the NATO nations and above all the United States resolved to begin a new round of the arms race. In May 1978, the North Atlantic bloc in a provocative manner approved a decision for an annual 3-percent increase in the military expenditures of the member states up to the middle of the 1990's. Under U.S. pressure, a decision was taken to deploy new types of medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. The Carter Administration deferred

ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty and approved Directive No 59 which proclaimed a new U.S. nuclear strategy aimed at undermining the strategic stability in the world and at deceiving the world community.

Washington has constantly sought for the Western European countries to obediently follow in the channel of American imperialist policy. However, the dictating of conditions by the United States more and more often has misfired.

Among the nations with a different social system, the greatest experience of cooperation in the area of detente has been gained between the USSR and France. Constancy and a high degree of mutual understanding and trust--precisely this for many years has marked Soviet-French relations. The joint efforts of the USSR and France to a significant degree have contributed to preventing an escalation of tension. Regardless of the pressure by pro-Atlantic circles both within the country and outside it, France as a whole has adhered to a policy of maintaining contacts with the USSR and with the other socialist countries.

In recent years the development of Soviet-West German relations has followed an ascending line and has acquired a new content. This is manifested both in the political contacts, in broad economic ties and in cultural and scientific exchange. Of course, the Soviet relations with the FRG cannot help but be seriously influenced by the fact that West Germany is a NATO member and is actively carrying out the policy of this aggressive bloc. It was with active FRG support that the NATO countries approved a decision for the production and deployment of the medium-range American nuclear missiles in Europe. However, as was emphasized in the joint communique on the results of the last visit of the FRG Federal Chancellor H. Schmidt to the USSR, West Germany and the USSR, while having a different assessment of the reasons for the occurring exacerbation of the international situation, as before "consider a lessening of tension to be essential, possible and useful."

With the coming to power of the Thatcher government in Great Britain, Soviet-English relations have not developed positively. When the Conservative Government in May 1979 promulgated its foreign policy program, in general outlines it intended to achieve a further improvement in the relations between East and West, including with the Soviet Union. But even then one could notice that this statement did not conform to the main provisions of the stated program. The Soviet Union, in constantly viewing England as an important international partner, on its behalf demonstrated a desire to develop cooperation with it and to seek out points of contact in settling urgent international problems and in continuing the process of detente and disarmament. Now it is up to the English side to show good will.

The difficulties which have arisen at the end of the 1970's and the start of the 1980's in the international situation convincingly affirm the urgent need to supplement detente in the political area by measures to limit and subsequently halt the arms race. The Soviet Union has been and is in favor of this. It has come forward with a whole series of constructive proposals the implementation of which would make it possible to achieve a fundamental change on the question of disarmament. Definite steps have already been taken in this direction. With the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, objective prerequisites were strengthened for progress in the area of disarmament.

The move from the "Cold War" and from dangerous confrontation to a lessening of tension was related primarily to changes in the balance of forces on the world scene. These changes have been particularly noticeable in Europe. Here the positions of socialism and the effect of the coordinated policy of the socialist states are strongest. Europe which not so long ago was marked by perhaps the highest level of tension in the world is now a good example of stability and thereby is making an important contribution to the preservation of universal peace. The Europeans have been convinced that detente, having put down deep roots in their land, will bear fruit tangible in the daily life of all the peoples of the continent. And quite naturally they do not want to give up the advantages of detente and are seriously disconcerted by the attempts of certain circles to shift the difficulties which have arisen in various regions of the world to the European Continent.

The imperialist circles of the NATO states, on the contrary, are hoping on an aggravation of the confrontation, on heightening the tension and on returning to the notorious policy of "from a position of strength" and to the "Cold War." As was stated by the leaders of the Warsaw Pact states at a meeting in Moscow on 5 December 1980, the arms race is acquiring an evermore dangerous nature. In various regions of the world there survive centers of military confrontations and tension. New conflicts are arising. The situation requires increased vigilance against the aggressive drives of the imperialist forces and the attempts of the reaction to harm the positions of the socialist states, the developing countries and the national liberation movements.

In this situation the socialist states are decisively in favor of immediate actions for the sake of peace and disarmament. They are insisting on concrete and completely feasible measures which, without disrupting the existing military strategic equilibrium, would lead to a lessening of tension and military confrontation.

For the purposes of creating a favorable climate for the corresponding measures, the USSR and its allies have proposed to agree that as of a certain date no state or grouping of states in Europe would increase the size of its armed forces in the region defined by the Final Act. Along with this there would be no expansion of the existing military groupings but work must be done to overcome the opposition and splintering of Europe.

Due to the well-known NATO decisions, the question of the medium-range nuclear missiles has assumed exceptional urgency. In the course of the talks between the USSR and FRG leaders, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev affirmed that it would be right to return to a status which existed prior to the approval of these decisions. In being guided by a desire to get things off dead center, the Soviet side at the same time has proposed a new variation. Without waiting for the ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty, but, of course, under the condition that the achieved accords would be implemented only after this document came into force, to begin discussing the question of the medium-range nuclear missiles simultaneously and in an organic link with the question of the American forward based nuclear weapons. Such talks, as is known, have started in Geneva. The future will show whether the American side is ready for a business-like, constructive dialogue.

Whatever question of international life is discussed, the Soviet position is always principled, constructive and honest. New confirmation of this is the entire range



of measures for the strengthening of peace and improving the international atmosphere as proposed by the USSR from the rostrum of the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly. The world political forum was confronted with the urgent question "of certain immediate measures to reduce the danger of war." A broad and business-like program for checking the arms race has been put forward in the Soviet Memorandum "For Peace and Disarmament, for Guarantees of International Security." The true concern for mankind can also be seen in the Soviet draft resolution on the historic responsibility of states to protect the world environment for the present and future generations and for this the world must be freed of the arms race and its possible consequences. To prevent the threatening course of events is the purpose of the immediate measures proposed by the Soviet Union.

The entire experience of international life has shown that there is only one way to the security of states and peoples and that is the halting of the arms race and a transition to real disarmament, including universal and complete disarmament. A world without war and weapons--this is the prospect opened up by the range of constructive ideas and proposals from the USSR.

The course of events in the world has affirmed the correctness and justness of the analysis given at the 25th CPSU Congress for the development of the international situation. The Soviet people and their armed defenders completely and fully approve and support the international program of the party's activities. The decisions of the coming 26th CPSU Congress which embody the will and aspirations of all communists and all the Soviet people will serve as a solid basis for the further advancement of our country toward communism and for new successes in the struggle to preserve and strengthen peace.

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